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politikalarıyla yakından ilişkilidir. Nüfusa yönelik olarak uygulanan
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vergi, ticaret, endüstri ve askeriye için nüfusun korunmasının ve
artırılmasının önemi, hükümetin Tanzimatın ilk yıllarındaki nüfus
politikalarıyla şekillendirilmiştir. Tanzimat’tan sonra devlet nüfusu bir gelir
kaynağı olarak düşünmeye başladıktan sonradır ki, çeşitli kurumsal
düzenlemelerle ve yönetmeliklerle nüfusu korumaya ve artırmaya
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INTRODUCTION
 The Tanzimat era (1839-1876) has mostly been studied either as a
set of ‘modernization’, or ‘westernization’ processes whereby the economic
and legal developments of the period are attributed solely to impact of the
West, or, as a period that witnessed increasing economic and political
penetration of Western powers into the Ottoman territories. Both
approaches are inclined to understate the internal dynamics of the Ottoman
society and the Tanzimat reform policies. They neglect the increased
sensitivity of the Ottoman state to the demands of the population and the
“great transformation”7 that it underwent in the nineteenth century as part of
the European interstate system.
Although the economic, social, educational and military
developments after the Tanzimat era had been studied,8 not much is known
about the nature of Ottoman population policies, especially those in the first
half of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the relative scarcity of studies
on nineteenth century Ottoman society impedes scholars’ ability to examine
the significance of the population issue, which had formed the basis of the
reforms after Tanzimat in the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the objective
                                                          
7 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of
Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944).
of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of the population policies
in the Tanzimat era. It will argue that the objective of Ottoman government
in developing agriculture, trade, and industry was strongly interrelated with
its population policies, and that the Tanzimat policies of the 1840s
constituted a coherent body. A large population was the precondition for
economic revitalization after the Tanzimat proclamation,9 and as such, the
Tanzimat mirrored the developments in other European countries.
In the Tanzimat era, the economy was based on agriculture, which
was characterized by abundance of land and scarcity of labor and capital, as
well as by technological backwardness.10 The government implemented
several economic and social policies to mobilize its resources. These
policies consisted of protecting the existing population, controlling the
population movements, promoting procreation, and giving subsidies and
lending money with interest to peasants.
                                                                                                                                                  
8 It can be argued that these studies have been very limited in their concerns owing
to the fact that most of Ottoman archival materials for the Tanzimat period was not
available for the researchers until the 1990s.
9 Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social
Characteristics (Madison, Wis. : University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 62 [hereafter
cited as: Karpat, Ottoman Population].
10 Şevket Pamuk, Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914, 3rd edition
(İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1993), p. 171-4 [hereafter cites as: Pamuk, İktisat Tarihi];
Karpat, Ottoman Population, p. 61; Donald Quataert, Workers, Peasants, and Economic
Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914 (Beylerbeyi, İstanbul : Isis Press, 1993) p. 24,
[hereafter cited as: Quataert, Workers, Peasants] and “Age of Reforms, 1812-1914”, in An
Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, Halil İnalcık with
Donald Quataert (eds) (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1994), 759-
943, pp. 843-52 [hereafter cited as: Quataert, “Age of Reforms”]; M. A. Ubicini,
Osmanlı'da Modernleşme Sancısı (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 1998), pp. 257-65 [hereafter
cites as: Ubicini, Osmanlı’da Modernleşme].
One of the most important characteristics of Ottoman agricultural
economy for centuries11 and particularly for Tanzimat era was ostensibly
high land/labor ratio. The land/labor ratio is determined by dividing land
under cultivation with the rural population.12 The general population trends
prevented the development of intensive agriculture, and extensive
agriculture was the dominant practice throughout the empire.13 Therefore,
the nature of state intervention via regulation changed dramatically every
field of agricultural economy during the nineteenth century.14
The protection and procreation policies were designed to overcome
the deficiencies of the land/labor ratio in the Ottoman agricultural economy.
The abundance of land and shortage of labor forced the government to treat
the population as a source of wealth and to direct its efforts to maintain its
means of subsistence and security. The aim of the government was to
                                                          
11 For the effect of land-labor relations on population growth in the sixteenth
century North Central Anatolia, see Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman
Empire. Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman
Anatolia during the Sixteenth Century (Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1994).
12 Joel Mokyr, “Malthusian Models and Irish History”, Journal of Economic
History 40:1, The Tasks of Economic History (Mar., 1980), 159-166, p. 164 [hereafter
cited as: Mokyr, Malthusian Models]. A more specific definition of land/labor ratio is the
quotient of the acreage of agricultural land available and the number of workers available
to cultivate it. Thus, the land/labor ratio can be calculated in two ways: first, over a whole
country, and second, for an individual plot. In this study, the concentration will be on the
high land/labor ratio of the Ottoman Empire (Roderick Floud and D. N. McCloskey (eds).
The Economic History of Britain Since 1700. 2nd Edition. Vol I: 1700-1860 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 464).
13 Pamuk, İktisat Tarihi; Reşat Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World
Economy: The Nineteenth Century (Albany : State University of New York Press, c1988)
[hereafter cited as: Kasaba, Ottoman Empire]; and Quataert, “Age of Reforms”.
14 Quataert claims that: “During the nineteenth century, the state began to
encroach upon life in the countryside in an manner rarely, if ever, seen during the long
centuries of the Ottoman imperium. This encroachment was part of a larger process, the
Tanzimat reform program of centralization and Westernization, that sought to rebuild
flourish agriculture by increasing the number of cultivators and protecting
the existing ones.
Before the 1870s Ottoman institutional arrangements in agriculture
were specifically directed to steer the organization and regulation of
economic life,15 and to improve the circumstances of Ottoman subjects. Yet,
as Palairet points out, in an agrarian economy, population density is
essential for the development of economy.16 In general, the population
densities were very low (less than 20 persons per km²) in the Balkans17
during the first half of the nineteenth century. As the state identified the
population as a source of income after the Tanzimat, it tried to increase the
density of its population through certain institutional arrangements and
regulations.
Furthermore, low population density, which characterized the
Ottoman lands, was also detrimental for the industrial growth of the
Ottoman state. Industrial development also needed more labor power, thus,
major industrial development generally occurred in areas where there was
relatively high population densities in the Balkans.18
The formation of the Ottoman modern state in the nineteenth
century was also closely related with the population issue. Once the
                                                                                                                                                  
Ottoman military and civil power to ensure the state’s continued survival” (Quataert,
Workers, Peasants, p. 32 and “ Age of Reforms”, p. 762).
15 Michael Palairet, The Balkan Economies c. 1800-1914: Evolution Without
Development (Cambridge, UK. : New York : Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 1
[hereafter cited as: Palairet, Balkan Economies]
16 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
17 Ibid., p. 22.
perception of population as a source of wealth emerged, obtaining
information about the population inevitably became a priority. Population
came to be considered as an economic resource from which the state
derived income for its treasury and conscripts for its armies. Subsequently,
the state introduced the practice of recording all members of society.
Briefly, this meant that the focus on ‘population’ became a precondition for
the formation of the Ottoman modern state in the nineteenth century.19
This thesis will consider two dimensions of the Ottoman policies
concerning the protection and procreation of its subjects. The first
dimension is the ways in which the Ottoman state implemented new
techniques or reshaped old ones in order to prevent emigration and
population movements, to increase the population size, and to provide
security for its subjects. The second will be the issue of whether the aim of
the Ottoman state to increase population was compatible with the general
interests/concerns of the population.
For the most part, the protection policies stemmed from the need for
keeping the productive part of the population remain uninjured, and thus
aimed at providing the means to ensure the subsistence and maintenance for
the peasantry. It was necessary to protect of the population from bandit
attacks and from the oppressions of local landowners. To this end, the
                                                                                                                                                  
18 Ibid., especially chapters 2 and 3.
19 See the “Introduction” in Silvana Patriarca, Numbers and Nationhood: Writing
Statistics in Nineteenth Century Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) for
government tried to control the movement of population by implementing
new measures for registration, establishing permanent police forces in
certain centers, and developing sanitary services.
The procreation policies included enforcement of marriages and
encouragement of reproduction within marriages while they discouraged
traditional birth control methods and practices. Furthermore, they granted
allowances and pensions to newly born children and prohibited the
kidnapping of girls and marriages among extended families.
The immediate Tanzimat era seems to be a period of rules and
regulations aimed at the protection and procreation of the population.
Although there is insufficient statistical data to draw conclusions on the
results of the post-Tanzimat population policies,20 this thesis will examine
the policies of the state toward its population as well as the responses of the
subjects to these policies during the three decades after the Tanzimat.
To achieve this aim, examples from nineteenth century Ottoman
archival documents, all of which pertain to the Balkan provinces of the
Empire, compiled from the İrade (Decree) catalogues in the Prime Ministry
Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) will be given. These
documents, which are classified according to dates of issue except for
Cevdet Tasnifi, are very valuable sources for understanding the nature of
                                                                                                                                                  
an eloquent discussion of how population statistics became to be one of the factors of the
unification and formation of the Italian state.
administration in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. These
irades issued by the High Council of State (Meclis-i Vala) will shed light to
the issues related to the social, economic, political, and educational
developments in the Ottoman society after the Tanzimat reforms in 1840s.
All the words in the archival documents were translated to the modern
Turkish orthography.
This thesis investigates the population policies of the Ottoman
Empire during the immediate Tanzimat period. Chapter I describes the
protection side of the population policies from 1840s to 1860s. This period
is important because, to a great extent, it determined the form of the
Ottoman policies during the second half of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. I sought for the origins of these policies in the archival
documents of the period. Chapter I also deals with the social, economic,
military, educational and sanitary aspects of the population issue in the
Balkans as well as its external and internal dimensions.
Chapter II is concerned with the procreation policies of the Ottoman
Empire in the light of a discussion on Malthus and two nineteenth century
writers, namely Namık Kemal and Hyde Clarke. This discussion is followed
by a description of the process whereby the Ottoman state managed to solve
the problems of population issue. It ends with final concluding remarks on
the population growth within the Empire.
                                                                                                                                                  
20 Nikolai Todorov, The Balkan City, 1400-1900 (Seattle and London: University
of Washington Press, 1983) [hereafter cited as: Todorov, Balkan City]; Karpat, Ottoman
I. THE PROTECTION OF POPULATION
The military defeates of in the early nineteenth century forced the
Ottoman government to seek acquiring information about the demographic
basis on which it can reorganize the army and increase the tax revenues.21
To this aim, a census was held in 1830/31, in which only the male
population was counted. The purpose of this census was to have
information on the number of conscripts and on tax liabilities.22 Thus, this
census was very similar to earlier tax registers.23 It only highlighted the
financial and military administration for taxes and conscription.24 The
subsequent censuses were more complex in nature and detailed.
Although the results are unpublished, there were more information
pertaining to the composition of the population in the second census, which
was undertaken in 1844.25 The census officials were chosen among the
                                                                                                                                                  
Population and Quataert, “Age of Reforms”.
21 Daniel Panzac, Population et Santé dans l’Empire Ottoman (XVIII – XX siècles)
(İstanbul: Les Editions Isis, 1996), p. 77 [hereafter cites as: Panzac, Population et Santé].
22 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İlk Nüfus Sayımı 1831 (Ankara,
1943), p. 189 and Karpat, Ottoman Population, p. 19. The official explanation was “to
correct the tax inequities which had resulted from the change in property values, from
transfers of land and use of old land deeds, and from the continuation of tax exemptions
given in the past to derbends for the maintenance of roads and bridges now no longer in
existence.” (Karpat, Ottoman Population, p. 20).
23 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi (Ankara, 1992), p. 188n105. The
government ordered that the census was to be conducted according to the old method (usul-
i sabıka) (Karpat, Ottoman Population, p. 19).
24 Pierre Maestri, Compte Rendu General des Travaux du Congrès International
de Statistique dans les Sessions de Bruxelles 1853; Paris 1855; Vienne 1857: Londres
1860 et Berlin 1863 publié par ordre du Ministre de l’agriculture, de l’industrie et du
commerce sous la direction de Pierre Maestri (Florence: Imprimerie de G. Barbara, 1866)
[hereafter cited as: Maestri, Compte Rendu General], p. 267; Karpat, Ottoman Population,
p. 19; and BOA İrade, Dahiliye 5284 (17 Cumade’l-ahir [12]61/23 June 1845).
25 Ubicini, Osmanlı’da Modernleşme and Maestri, Compte Rendu General.
members of the religious establishment, such as judges and scholars.26 They
performed continuous visits within their localities and prepared regular
annual tables containing data on births and deaths, the number of travelers,
medical service, transfers of the properties, the amount of the new
conscriptions, real and movable losses resulting from fire, epizootics, and
the like. After being checked for their accuracy, the documents served
different purposes concerning: age, profession, religion, military service,
apportionment of taxes, and the like.27 This kind of detailed information
was the first step in dealing with the population issue more seriously.
In the same year also the temettuat (revenues) surveys was initiated
throughout the Empire. These surveys registered and classified property,
including cultivated and uncultivated land, animals, stores, as well as
agricultural produces and income of individuals gained from these goods
and resources, in agricultural economy.28 The objective of these surveys
was to organize a new system of taxation in order to meet the fiscal needs of
the Ottoman state. The Tanzimat decree abolished all customary taxes,
except for the tithe (aşar), the head tax on non-Muslims (cizye) and sheep
                                                          
26 Karpat, Ottoman Population, p. 20.
27 Maestri, Compte Rendu General des Travaux and Ubicini, Osmanlı’da
Modernleşme.
28 For an excellent discussion of temettuat registers, see Huri İslamoğlu,
“Statistical Constitution of Property Rights on Land in the 19th Century Ottoman Empire:
An Evaluation of Temettuat Registers”, Paper delivered at the Conference on Land Issues
in the Middle East, Harvard University (March 1996); Mübahat Kütükoğlu, “Osmanlı
Sosyal ve İktisadi Kaynaklarından Temettü Defterleri”, Belleten 59:225 (1995), pp. 395-
418; Alp Yücel Kaya, Dynamics of a Regional Economy Through the Temettuat Defters:
Bayindir (İzmir) in 1845, Unpublished M. Sc. Thesis, Middle East Technical University,
1998.
and other animals (ağnam resmi). The customary taxes that were abolished
were replaced by a fixed tax called vergi or an-cemaatin vergi.29 This
system was designed to increase the revenues of the state, to establish a
centralized control on tax collection and a moderate taxation system for the
population, which aimed at eliminating inequalities among regions.
In 1845, the next year after the first census and the temettuat
registration, the central government deciced to introduce new policies
concerning the population issue. The policies directed towards population
addressed three concerns central to Ottoman modern state building in the
nineteenth century. These were the concern to tax, and to create a labor
force for agricultural production and local reconstruction projects, and to
draft soldiers for the modern armies.
The success of these policies was dependent on the government’s
dissemination of its control through the local networks. The early nineteenth
century, up to the 1840s, was a period of struggle between the government
and local power blocs. To this aim, the state first tried to break up the
taxation claims of the local landowners, judiciary, tax-farmers and
contractors.30 Put differently, the newly planned tax reforms after the
                                                          
29 Reşat Kaynar, Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat (Ankara : Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve
Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 1991), pp. 258-63 [hereafter cited as: Kaynar, Tanzimat]; Shaw,
Stanford J. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 84 [hereafter cited as: Shaw, Ottoman Empire];
Abdüllatif Şener, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Vergi Sistemi (İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları,
1990), pp.1-2 [hereafter cited as: Şener, Osmanlı Vergi Sistemi].
30 Bruce McGowan, “The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1812”, in An Economic and
Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, H. İnalcık and D. Quataert (eds)
Tanzimat forced the Ottoman state to abandon its dependence upon the
local notables (aghas) and tax-farmers (mültezims) in order to obtain a
relative freedom, at least, in financial matters. The local landowners paid
very little or no taxes and enjoyed a relative independence in collecting
local taxes, since their military participation in state’s war campaigns gave
them certain privileges.31 On the other hand, tax-farmers became dominant
actors in the local administration by acquiring property, to the disadvantage
of subjects.
Muhassıls (tax collectors) were sent to the provinces to eliminate the
privileges of these groups on collecting local taxes.32 This muhassıllık
system degenarated and became inoperative in a very short time. The first
reason of this degeneration was the incapabilities of these persons to
analyze the conditions in the provinces and their inefficiency in collecting
taxes. The second was the economic conflict between muhassıls and local
landowners. The third was the administrative conflicts between the valis
and the muhassıls. The government did not draw a functional separation
                                                                                                                                                  
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 637-758 [hereafter cited
as: McGowan, ”Age of Ayans”].
31 Kasaba, Ottoman Empire, pp. 80-1; Quataert, “Age of Reforms”, p. 797; Yuzo
Nagata, Tarihte Âyânlar: Karaosmanoğulları Üzerinde Bir İnceleme (Ankara: Türk Tarih
Kurumu, 1997), p.1.
32 BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 251 (18 Zilkade [12]55/23 January 1840); BOA, İrade,
Dahiliye 260 (20 Zilkade [12]55/25 January 1840); BOA, İrade, Meclis-i Vala 7 (2
Muharrem [12]56/6 March 1840); BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 411 (9 Muharrem [12]56/13
March 1840); BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 478 (25 Muharrem [12]56/29 March 1840); BOA,
İrade, Dahiliye 515 (1 Safer [12]56/4 April 1840); BOA, İrade, Meclis-i Vala 57 (29
Rebiyyü’l-evvel [12]56/31 May 1840); and Şener, Osmanlı Vergi Sistemi, p.1; and Kaynar,
Tanzimat, pp. 285-63.
between the administrative domains of these officials.33 Thus, this way of
controlling the localities did not totally prevent resistances against the
state’s centralization project.
The government realized that any effort coming from the centre to
break up the powers of these groups increased their resentment and proved
to be difficult to implement. With the recognition of this reality, that is the
reforms could not be done without the support of these groups, the
government relied on the power of local landowners (vücuh) and the non-
Muslim community leaders (kocabaşıs) over the population, as before.
Thus, representatives from each province were invited to İstanbul to discuss
the policies that the government aimed at introducing.34 In 1845, a special
commission met in the capital. The government gave a memorandum,
which explained the objectives of the Tanzimat reforms and encouraged
them to reveal their opinions on reforms, and to state the necessities and
conditions of their localities. To a great extent, they pointed out that the
people were living in poor conditions and asked for state support as loans to
enable the people, to clean the rivers and to direct them to their original
courses. They asked for a just distribution of fallow and empty fields for
                                                          
33 BOA, İrade, Meclis-i Vala 70 (20 Rebiyyü’l-ahir [12]56/21 June 1840); BOA,
İrade, Meclis-i Vala 74 (24 Rebiyyü’l-ahir [12]56/25 June 1840); BOA, İrade, Meclis-i
Vala 100 (2 Cumade’l-ahir [12]56/1 August 1840); BOA, İrade, Meclis-i Vala 246 (14
Zilhicce [12]56/6 February 1841); Şener, Osmanlı Vergi Sistemi.
34 Tevfik Güran, “Ziraî Politika ve Ziraatte Gelişmeler, 1839-1876”, in 150.
Yılında Tanzimat (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992), 219-33, p. 222 [hereafter
cited as: Güran, “Ziraî Politika]. The Aydın delegates of this commission consisted of the
chief clerk of the Customs Office, an ex-governor, local judges, merchants and landowners
(quoted in Kasaba, Ottoman Empire, p. 59).
cultivation and permission for free trade in grain. They, furthermore,
expressed opinions on the rearrangement of taxes. This later demand was
proved to be consistent with government’s future plans for tax reforms. But,
in the end, the central government declared that a rearrangement of taxation
and new rules for grain trade could only be done after the end of the
temettuat registration.35
Nevertheless, the government did not want to deliver the control of
reconstruction projects totally to local authorities. To this end, Councils of
Reconstruction (Mecalis-i İmariyye) were established in the regions
included within Tanzimat reforms. The Councils of Reconstruction were
consisted of the members of the merchants’ guilds and religious
establishment.36 The first venture of these councils was to survey the
economic conditions of the Ottoman subjects. Second, they were to
investigate the agricultural lands and people working on them. In other
words, they were to find out whether the population of a region was
sufficient for agricultural cultivation or not. In relation to this, they were to
sketch empty lands suitable for settlement of population.37 Third, they had
to determine the possible tax contribution of a given region and make plans
                                                          
35 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845).
36 “[M]eclis-i İmariyye namıyle bazirgan ve da‘iyan-ı Devlet-i Aliyyeden müretteb
olarak dahil-i da‘ire-i Tanzimat olan mahallere meclisler ta‘yin buyurılmış[tır.]” (BOA,
İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 (1261/1845), Lef 15), emphasis mine.
37 The government sent engineers and cartographers to the provinces for repairing
and marking the various locations, including buildings, bridges, canals, and other
unspecified things of the same category, with numbers, and for preparing the maps and
plans of those locations (BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 5284 (17 Cumade’l-ahir [12]61/23 June
1845) ).
for the roads and rivers that needed construction, reconstruction, or
cleaning.38 Although not mentioned here, the Councils were asked to
investigate into matters relating to improvements, such as the restoration of
bridges and buildings, cleaning of canals and opening new ones, and
strengthening of fortresses.39
Of these improvements, opening new canals, watercourses and
cleaning existing ones were the most important ones, because they were
indispensable for the progress of trade, agriculture, transportation,
sanitation, and irrigation.40 The major aim of these projects on irrigation
was to encourage the development of a market for trade and agriculture. For
this reason, particular instructions were given to the Councils of
Reconstruction for investigation.41 In one of these instructions, the
government wanted to know the conditions of the roads and bridges that
people used while going to ports and market places.42 At the same time,
these projects were aimed at preventing seasonal floods, spread of diseases,
                                                          
38 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 78 ([12]61/1845) and Tevfik Güran, 19. Yüzyıl
Osmanlı Tarımı, (İstanbul Eren Yayınları, 1998), pp. 45-50 [hereafter cited as: Güran,
Osmanlı Tarımı].
39 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845). For a discussion of the
operations of these local councils and their applications, see Stanford J. Shaw, “Local
Administrations in the Tanzimat”, in 150. Yılında Tanzimat (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu
Basımevi, 1992), pp. 33-49.
40 “Bu makule tesviye-i turuk ve tathir-i enhar küşad-ı mecra keyfiyyatı esbab-ı
i’mariyye-i mülkiyyenin ve tevsi’-i ticaret ve zira’at-ı teba’anın şart-ı azamından olmasile
pek lüzumlu mu’tena şeyler olub, fakat keyfiyyet-i tesviye vü tanzimi ve mesarifat-ı
vakı’anın tahkiki icab-ı maslahatdan olmagla bu misillü hususat-ı mütenevvi’a-i
i’mariyyenin tahkikat-ı lazımasile icab u iktizalarının iş’arı hususı ta’limat-ı mahsusa ile
Mecalis-i i‘mariyye me‘murlarına havale olunmış olmagla tahkikat-ı lazımalarından
cümlesinin keyfiyyatı anlaşıldıkdan sonra icra-yı icabatına i‘tina kılınacağı.” (BOA, İrade,
Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845), Lef 15).
41 Ibid.
harms of locusts and insects, which generally caused bad harvest.43
Furthermore, the feasibility of draining and cleaning of rivers and opening
up new canals depended on the expected profits from cultivation. For
instance, particular instructions were given to the Councils of
Reconstruction to investigate the courses of some rivers if directed to
uncultivated fields create a possibility for the peasants to gain profits from
rice cultivation.44
The successes of the local reconstruction projects were important for
the local population. First, the reforms in irrigation system could benefit the
small peasants holders. The costs of bringing water from a nearby river by
building up canals exceeded peasants’ ability to pay. On the other hand, the
wealthy landowners could benefit from these policies by cutting the
expenses of constructing canals to their estates. Although the government
wanted to extend the benefits of irrigation to small peasant holders, the local
landowners probably resisted this policy, since water resources were
scarce.45 Second, the construction of roads and bridges could lower the
costs of transportation of agricultural produces to ports and marketplaces.
They could also make the collection of taxes easier.46 The local
reconstruction works continued until the Crimean War. However, due to the
                                                                                                                                                  
42 Ibid.
43 Kasaba, Ottoman Empire, pp. 60-2.
44 Ibid.
45 I did not encounter any document mentioning such resistances. But, the Turkish
government’s policies of irrigation in 1960s revealed widespread conflicts between
peasants and local landowners. This conflict was one of the major plots in Turkish movies
of the period .
increased military expenses, many of these works were abandoned and the
function of reconstruction councils in the process lost its value.47 Thus,
before the period of increased European demand for the Ottoman
agricultural products, especially after the Crimean and American Civil wars,
the central government was trying to establish a basis for the development
of a home market, whereby peasants could enter into exchange relationships
with each other without intermediaries. Since transportation costs were
high, except for those peasants whose fields were closer to marketplaces,
majority of peasants depended on intermediaries to bring their production to
the market.48 The governmental efforts in constructing new roads and
repairing old ones, opening up new waterways and canals, maintaining the
security of roads and bridges were all aimed at providing more peaceful and
protective market environment for individual peasants.
All these local infrastructural reconstruction projects were
centralized and paid by the central government, which put more burdens to
the central treasury and increased the need for a rearrangement of existing
taxes. Thus, the regularization of taxes as a specific and definite proportion,
and their equalization among regions included in the Tanzimat reforms was
to be handled to increase the revenues of the central treasury.49 The central
government stressed that the increase in the revenues of the state should not
                                                                                                                                                  
46 Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, p. 11.
47 Ibid., p.87.
48 Kasaba, Ottoman Empire, p. 84.
be less than its expenses. Yet, during the process of tax distribution and
collection, the state officials were to be concerned with the conditions and
abilities of the subjects to pay taxes as measured by their annual revenues.
Be that as it may, the central government was actually interested in the level
of increase in overall taxes with the end of the temettuat registration.50
These registers would include individual revenues as well as revenues
accruing from individual villages, that is, the total amount of taxes. The
estimate of the regional proportion of tax rate was to be decided after a strict
analysis of these registers.51
Apart from the standardization of taxation, the central state also
decided to impose a second category of taxes, which is called the public
contribution (isti'ane-i umumiye). This type of tax was mainly based on the
idea that the subjects should contribute to the state’s public improvement
projects. The idea behind the newly established social contract between the
state and the subjects after the Tanzimat was that the political existence of
subjects before courts of law would only be actualized by the payment of
taxes and making necessary public contributions. However, the article of
public contributions was postponed and decided to be not publicized until
                                                                                                                                                  
49 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845) and BOA, İrade, Mesail-i
Mühimme 78 ([12]61/1845).
50 This concern was expressed in an irade as: “Although the exact information on
the revenues will be understood after the registration of the yearly revenues of the subjects,
the expected increase in the annual income of the state would be realized after the arrival
of all rough copies of the temettuat defters.” (BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 78
([12]61/1845), emphasis mine).
51 BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 5284 (17 Cumade’l-ahir [12]61/23 June 1845) and BOA,
İrade, Dahiliye 603 (29 Safer [12]56/2 May 1840).
the central government finished the compilation of the revenue
registration.52
Besides capital, all these works necessitated and were dependent on
more labor force. There was the problem of labor contribution of the public
relating with these improvement projects of the Ottoman state.53 Since
corvée labor was abolished with the Tanzimat decree, the reconstruction
projects were to be carried out by wage labor. Therefore, the central
government ordered the Councils of Reconstruction to determine suitable
people among local population as wage laborers. However, in order not to
distract agricultural production, they could import wage laborers from other
provinces, when necessary.54 However, the abolishment of corvée with the
Tanzimat Decree did not apply everywhere in the same way. For example, it
was one of the causes of revolts in Niş (1841) and Vidin (1851), which will
be dealt in detail later:
In the Vidin area, conflict between villagers who refused to perform
angarya after the proclamation of Gülhane and local officials reached such
proportions that the matter was referred to İstanbul. Although the capital
decided in favour of the villagers, the local meclis dominated by the aghas
                                                          
52 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 78 ([12]61/1845).
53 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845); BOA, İrade, Meclis-i Vala
4475 (29 Cumade’l-ahir [12]60/16 July 1844); and BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 5284 (17
Cumade’l-ahir [12]61/23 June 1845).
54 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845).
rearranged taxation so that no real changes took place. The peasantry also
complained of being force to do unpaid labour on roads and bridges.55
In 1851, the local councils were once again informed that the corvée
had been abolished with the proclamation of Tanzimat and people should
not be used in private service of local officials and landowners and in local
reconstruction projects by way of corvée labor.56 This was one of the
measures that were aimed at keeping a part of the population, especially
poor, under state control by providing employment in infrastructural
projects.
These decrees, also, set certain duties for the local officials, such as
the control of revenues and the apportionment of taxes (vergi) during the
survey of the temettuat registers, the means for assisting poor and needy
(i'ane-i fukara ve za‘fa), and the collection of the taxes only during the crop
season.57 By this way, the state tried to secure itself from possible
resentments. Furthermore, the central government set the priority for
                                                          
55 Mark Pinson, “Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period – The Revolts in
Nish (1841) and Vidin (1850)”, Middle Eastern Studies, 103-146, p. 115 [hereafter cited
as: Pinson, Ottoman Bulgaria]
56 Article 29 in Düstur, “Taşra Meclisine Verilen Talimat”, p. 878.
57 “Bu def’a memalik-i mahruse-i hazret-i şahaneden gelan vücuh ve kocabaşıların
bulundıkları memleketin iktiza-yı mevki’lerine gore levazım-i me’muriyyetine da’ir
verdikleri layihalarının ekseriyesinde münderic olan mevadın biri emval virgünün vakt-i
mahsulde tahsiline mübaşeret olunması ya’ni vakt-i mahsulatdan evvel ahaliden virgü
tahsili kendülerine pek güç gelerek şöyle ki mahsulat idrak itmiyan mevsimde ahali
sermayeden tehi-dest bulunarak huzurı  karz-ı güzeşte veyahud selem tarikiyle şundan
bundan akçe istikraz iderek virgü te’diyesine muhtac ve öyle vakitsiz virgü alınması
kendülerine akçe hususından tolayi ziyadesiyle ba’is-i zaruret ü ihtiyaç olmakdan naşi
emval virgünin vakt-i mahsulde tahsiline müsa’ade buyurılması niyaz u istid’a
olunmış[tır]” (BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 (1261/1845), Lef 15) and BOA, İrade,
Hariciye 1549 (24 Rebiyyü’l-ahir [12]62/22 April 1846).
enabling the population, because the success of the improvement projects
depended on assisting and securing the means for individuals’ maintenance
and subsistence.58 There are many decrees, which were sent to the local
officials, emphasizing the importance of the maintenance of the population
and the securing its subsistence and circumstances of the prosperity of the
property and of the subjects of the Ottoman state.59 The immediate
Tanzimat period was a passage from the older forms of charity to public
assistance by ways of allowances, loans, and public works. Previously,
guilds, vakıfs (pious foundations), and wealthy men used to distribute alms,
feed the poor, and contribute to the prosperity of their communities.
Therefore, the government acknowledged poverty as a social problem and
began to handle it in particular ways.
Accordingly, the government ordered money transfers to the
localities in the shape of loans with interest, in accordance with customary
practices. That is, the government decided to lend money to individuals at a
rate of monthly one per cent interest.60 However, in order to secure returns,
the officials of the councils were expected to investigate each locality for
their cash needs and to restrain the money that will be transferred, to
guarantors. In addition, the cash to be transferred should be used for
                                                          
58 BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 5220 (19 Cumade'l-ula [12]61/26 May 1845) and BOA,
İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845).
59 BOA, İrade, Meclis-i Vala 956 (3 Cumade’l ula [12]59/1 June 1843); BOA,
İrade, Dahiliye 5907 (9 Safer [12]62/6 February 1846); BOA, İrade, Meclis-i Vala 1468 (6
Rebiyyü’l-ahir [12]62/3 April 1846) and BOA, İrade, Meclis-i Vala 1532 (4 Receb
[12]62/28 June 1846).
necessary improvements, and essential regulations should be set beforehand
in order to prevent possible wastes in other places. Moreover, for the
purpose of determining the amount of the loans and securing them
beforehand, the government demanded the officials to acquire information
on the factors of production of each debtor, the time period for the debt
returns, and the means for finding guarantors, who would get loans.
Localities that did not need cash, but which could develop their trade and
agriculture when encouraged and endured, would also be paid.61
The objective of these policies was to protect the peasantry from the
exploitation of moneylenders. The debts taken with very high interests from
such bankers were an impediment to public improvement projects.62 Since
peasant indebtedness caused flight, the central government ordered that all
                                                                                                                                                  
60 Güran says that between 1843-1846, the government gave a total sum of 12.5
million kuruş (piastre) to peasant cultivators as loans (Güran, “Ziraî Politika”, p. 220).
61 “Fi’l-hakika istikmal-i esbab-i i’mariyye-i mülkiyye madde-i matlubası i’ane ve
ikdar-i ahaliye mütevakkıf ve menut ve bu dahi şera’it-i mer’iyye ü mahsusasına tatbiken
iktiza iden mahallere akçe i’tasiyle hasıl olacağı runümun olarak i’ane taleb iden ahaliye
şürut-ı borç ve usul-i vechile fa’izle karzen akçe virüleceği ve fakat ol emirde herbir
mahallin iktizasına göre istihsal-i levazım-ı ma’muriyyeti matlubası zımnında ne mikdar
i’ane-i nakdiyye i’tasına mevkuf ve muhtac olduğı ve cihet-i te’miniyyesile küfelaya rabt
olunması ve virilecek akçe ancak esbab-ı lazıma-ı i’mariyyeye sarf olunub, aher yerlere
telef olunmaması hususının rabıta ve zabıtası yoluna konulması lazıma-i maslahatdan
olarak bu hususların Meclis-i i’mariyye me’murlarına ta’limat-ı seniyye ile havale kılınmış
olmagla buna da’ir keyfiyyat-ı lazıma mahalleri usul ü nizamına bi’t-tatbik bu tarafa iş’ar
olınarak tobyekuni anlaşıldıkdan sonra iktizası vechile i’ane-i nakdiyye keyfiyyet olınacağı
kat’iyyen ma’lum olması ve ba’zı mahaller ahalisi i’ane-i nakdiyyeye muhtac olmıyarak
fakat memurin taraflarından teşvikat u ikdamat ile teksir-i zira’at ve ticaret ve hüsn-i suret
san’atları husule geleceğinden bu makulelere dahi mahalleri me’murini ve Mecalis-i
i’mariyye azaları iktizası vechile teşvikat u ikdamatı icra ve bu tarafa iş’arı lazım gelan
ba’zı müteferri’atı olduğı halde anın dahi icabına bakılmak üzre Der-sa’adete [vürud?]
eylemeleri keyfiyyatı dahi ta’limat-ı mahsusa ile müşarun muma-ileyhim taraflarına ihale
kılındığı.” (BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 (1261/1845, Lef 15).
62 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845). Poor villagers borrowed
money at an interest of 20 to 24 per cent per annum (McGowan, “Age of the Ayans” p.
696).
the transactions were to be just and in accordance with the fatwa issued by
the Sheikh-ul-Islam.63
The shortage of labor accompanied by the lack of technological
innovation prevented commercialization, market-orientation and
intensification of agriculture within the large landholdings (çiftliks) in the
Balkans.64 Even during the high European demand for Ottoman agricultural
products, relatively large arable parts of these estates remained unused.65
The sharecropping practices among peasants and landowners were
also affected by the labor scarcity and technological backwardness of
Ottoman agriculture. First, the land/labor ratio determined the terms of
sharecropping. In regions, where the ratio was high, that is, land was
abundant and labor was scarce, the terms of sharecropping usually
benefitted the sharecroppers. On the other hand, if the ratio was low, which
means land was scarce and labor was abundant, the terms of sharecropping
were disadvantegous to peasants, especially to the landless ones.66 Second,
the landowners preferred sharecropping if the costs of production were less
than that of technological innovation.67 Third, cultivation of commercial
crops, such as cotton, grapes, olives, and tobacco, needed less labor power
by using some relatively better techniques than the more traditional ones.68
                                                          
63 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845).
64 Quataert, Workers, Peasants, p. 22.
65 Ibid., p. 23 and Ubicini, Osmanlı’da Modernleşme, p. 258.
66 Tökin, Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı, 2nd edition (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990
[1934]), pp. 187-8.
67 Ibid., p.191.
68 Kasaba, Ottoman Empire, pp. 83-4.
Thus, the cultivation of these crops served the landowners interests.
However, the government tried to remedy the problem of labor shortage in
cultivation of commercial crops by promoting and encouraging small
peasant holders through governmental subsidies.69 Although the increase in
the agricultural products was restricted only to grain production, the central
government proclaimed that there was abundance of land for other more
profitable products. Hence, the government ordered the officials to ask for
the assistance of peasants and to explain them that the government was
planning to support and secure the maintenance of those peasants, who
would cultivate these profitable products.70 Fourth, for protecting
sharecroppers from the oppressions of landowners, the government directly
intervened into and regulated the contracts between landowners and
sharecroppers.71
The Control of Population Movements
The labor scarcity and technological backwardness forced the
Ottoman government to control the movement of population, which
accelerated during the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the
case of the Bulgarian peasants, Todorov argues that the relative scarcity of
                                                          
69 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845) and Güran, Osmanlı Tarımı,
p. 53 and pp. 75-80.
70 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845). Another measure for
protecting the producers was the order sent to those places, where horses and beasts of
burden were bred. As stated in the same irade, those breeders should sell some of their
animals to other places that there was scarcity of them.
land under cultivation was one of the causes of peasant flights. He adds that
peasants abstained from cultivation because of the burden of taxes and
certain difficulties that prevented bringing marginal lands into agriculture.72
The government’s efforts for controlling the movement of population had
two aims. First, a labor force for agricultural production and for projects of
reconstruction works was needed in the provinces. The poor and the
unemployed were to be kept alive under state’s protection. Their movement
was restricted, because they constituted in effect the necessary labor force.
Second, the government sought to prevent any loss in population through
migration.73 However, it was very difficult to implement these measures.
Most importantly, it was difficult to convince a poor man or an unemployed
person to stay in a place where there were very limited opportunities for
him to make a living. Peasants usually sought for a livelihood through
seasonal work and migratory labor.74 Another choice for rural peasants was
becoming bandits.
The late eigthteenth century was marked by a remarkable movement
of population, which began much earlier, from the countryside to the towns
and cities, to the highlands and to the Habsburg and Russian territories.
Two major reasons for these migrations were insecurity and unjust
governmental practices, such as unequal taxation, and inability of the
                                                                                                                                                  
71 See “Bosna Nizamnamesi” (1859), Düstur,  vol. 1, 3rd  ed. (İstanbul,
[12]82/1865-6),  78-84.
72 Todorov, Balkan City, p. 197.
73 BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 600 ([12[56/1840).
central state to prevent the mistreatment of peasants by local landowners
and state agents in the provinces.75 McGowan argues that these massive
migrations of peasants and their shift to banditry created negative effects on
the population growth within the Ottoman Empire, one being the
depopulation of a region through flight of the people.76 The flight of rural
population into cities increased the number of urban poor in search of new
opportunities to find jobs, even for very low wages. Todorov asserts that
this was a very common characteristic of the urban economy throughout the
Balkans in the nineteenth century.77 Thus, the frequent movement of
population from one place to another in search of better living conditions
was very widespread during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.
The Ottoman state used social, political, and economic means to
prevent the emigration and movement of population. The first attempts for
controlling the movement of population after Tanzimat began in 1840. An
imperial decree issued to muhassıls on the regulation of the movements of
population declared that the local officials did not pay enough attention to
                                                                                                                                                  
74 Todorov, Balkan City, pp. 66-70 and pp. 197-200 and Quataert, “Age of
Reforms”, pp. 892-5.
75 For the eighteenth century, see McGowan, “Age of Ayans”, pp. 646-50 and for
the nineteenth century, see Quataert “Age of Reforms”; Pamuk, İktisat Tarihi; and Kasaba ,
Ottoman Empire and certain decrees.
76 McGowan mentions that a new type of ‘transhumance’ emerged in the Balkans.
In this type, not only the shepherds sought for new pastures for their herds, but also men
usually looked for new opportunuties to supply better means of livelihood (idem, “Age of
Ayans”, pp. 647-8).
77 ibid., p. 198; Quataert, “Age of Reforms”; and Palairet, Balkan Economies.
the mürur article.78 According to this decree, all the residents of any district,
i.e. Muslims and zımmis, nomads and tribes, should take permission from
the local authorities, when planning to leave their regions. The muhassıls
had to give an official certificate, mürur tezkeresi (travel card), explaining
the reason and the period of travelling. This mürur tezkeresi served as a
kind of identification card.79 Without this document nobody could leave a
district.80 Later on, these mürur registers were synchronously used with
censuses.81
In 1860s, this mürur system was modified and became more
complex. Local and provincial councils were made responsible for
monitoring the practices on the acts of mürur system.82 This new
registration was more suitable for modern state practices and consistent
with a real census objective. After the registration of population, all
individuals were given official identity cards, which were called Osmanlı
Tezkeresi. Without these certificates, the people could not appeal to courts
for any type of petition. If any individual wanted to leave his hometown or
village, s/he was to apply to the property commissions (emlak komisyonu)
to certify in these tezkeres that s/he paid his/her property and profit taxes.
                                                          
78 BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 600 ([12[56/1840).
79 Karpat, Ottoman Empire, p. 35.
80 BOA, İrade, Cevdet Zaptiye 733 (24 Safer [12]61/4 March 1845).
81 BOA, Maliyyeden Müdevver Defterleri 8602 (1 Muharrem [12]62/30 December
1845 – 7 Rebiyyü’l-ahir [12]66/20 February 1850).
82 Article 19 in “Taşra Meclisine Verilen Talimat”, Düstur, vol. 1, 2nd ed., p. 875.
Otherwise, the person could not get a mürur tezkeresi for traveling.83 If any
person was captured in any place without an official seal on his/her tezkere
confirmed by property commissions, s/he was to be immediately sent back
to his home, or s/he could pay a bond (kefalet ücreti) to become free until a
decision was reached for his/her position. The identity cards of those
individuals, who were put into prison, were to be replaced with blue-colored
ones when they were released. For the government it was necessary for
distinguishing guilty and innocent subjects.84 These frequent movements of
population caused problems with properties that these emigrants left behind.
The government solved this problem by reallotting these properties to their
owners on their return.
The peasants, who fled to cities, had entrusted their immovable
holdings and properties to their relatives. They took away their movable
properties, such as sheep and other animals, and valuable items, together
with themselves. When they returned to their homelands with their families,
sheep, and other animals, these immovable properties were reallotted to
them. There were specific defters pertaining to these reallotments.
People also fled into the territories of another state due to insecure
conditions in their own villages. Most frequently, they crossed over the
borders to Greece, Serbia and Austria-Hungary. The importance given to
                                                          
83 “Tahrir İdareleri Tarafından İ‘tası Mukteza-yı İrade-i Aliyyeden Bulunan Nüfus
Tezkereleri Zahrına Yazılacak Nizamiyyedir” (14 Cumade’l-ula [12]77/28 November
1860), Düstur, I. Tertib, Cilt 1, p. 903.
84 Ibid.
agricultural production was also in the agenda of the Austria-Hungarian
Empire and Serbia. Like the Ottoman government, Serbian and Austrian
governments issued many decrees to encourage immigration and to increase
agricultural production.85 There was a constant competition between these
states for migratory peasants and wandering poor moving back and forth
across international borders. The triangular movement of rural populations
between Ottoman, Serbian, and Austrian territories made these states to
give certain concessions to peasantry, such as tax exemptions, land
allotments, allowances, and security in religious practices.86 Furthermore,
the competition between the Ottoman and Greek states for rural migrants
can be added to this picture. In 1846, the Finance Minister stated in
subsequent decrees that since the government was concerned with the
stability of the state and the public security, one could expect a slight
increase in the numbers of immigrant people from Greece. He demanded
officials to show considerateness in their treatments of these immigrants.87
However, the conditions were not so much different in these neighboring
countries. For example, Habsburg and Serbian taxes were heavy, so people
                                                          
85 Stoianovich, Traian. A Study in Balkan Civilization (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1967), pp. 178-9 [hereafter cited as: Stoianovich, Balkan Civilization]. For instance,
Serbian government issued decrees to the rural police to supervise peasants, whether they
were acting in accordance with governmental regulations, or not. But, Serbian
encouragement of immigration disturbed Austrian government . Thus in 1847, Metternich
issued a decree, which says: “Ever since [it has come to be persuaded that profits can be
derived from agriculture, [the government of] Serbia has been more inclined to promote the
cultivation of the soil…. In view of the fact that the natives have not yet decided to put
their hand to plow, [the government is pursuing a policy of making] welcome all
immigrants who are ready to their energies to agriculture” (quoted in ibid., p. 180).
86 Palairet, Balkan Economies, p. 22 and Karpat, Ottoman Population, p. 62.
87 BOA, İrade, Hariciye, 1549 (24 Rebiyyü’l-ahir [12]62/21 April 1846).
did not stay for long and usually returned back,88 when they observed that
nothing was changed in their lifestyles. There were examples showing
returns of peasants to their homelands.89 Similar reallotment processes were
also applied to these peasants following their return. Furthermore, only the
sheep of the returnees was registered in the defters (registers) and was
taxed. The unregistered cattle was not. To this end, the Finance Minister
had issued a specific order prohibiting the registration of cattle other than
sheep.90 The exclusion of cattle from registration was another form of
subsidy for the peasants. Moreover, these people were assigned guarantors
(kefil) in order to prevent other flights and were given their former
privileges and then registered in the defters with their sheep and settled in
various places written in those defters.91 In one sense, the process was very
similar to earlier Ottoman practices. That is, the government took proper
measures to prevent peasant flights and ‘to leave peasants strong enough to
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89 Fifteen peasant families, with a total population of forty-one persons, who fled
to Greece, where they stayed for three months, returned to Tırhala in 1845 (BOA, İrade,
Dahiliye 7090 (27 Safer [12]63/14 February 1847)). They had 2055 sheep. Seven of them
did not have any sheep, one had 600 (he had also six children, being the highest), one had
450, the other 300. The remaining five owned between 110 to 165. There were twenty five
children, one of the families did not have any. The average is 1. 8 children for per family.
90 Another example is the return of 34 families with a population of 88 persons
and 2608 sheep. There were also other kinds of cattle, but the Minister of Finance Safveti
Paşa said that there was no need for registration of them into the defters. In another
example, this time the petition was made by the heads of the finance office (mal müdürü)
and the governor of the province. Two weeks later, a decree was sent to them stating that
their petition was accepted (BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 7090 (27 Safer [12]63/14 February
1847)). Previosly, thirty four families with a population of 75 persons returned to Tırhala
(BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 6127 (1 Rebiyyü'l-ahir [12]62/29 March 1846)).
91 BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 6127.
sustain direct state taxation’.92 First, it tried to subsidize and augment the
existing levels of income. Second, it utilized measures to encourage the
peasants, who have fled their villages, to return.93 Third measure was to
send military officials to bring back runaway peasants.94
The Protection of Population and Police Measures
The two concerns of the Ottoman government, those of protecting
the population and maintaining order were at odds with each other. Military
policies after Tanzimat brought new contradictions to the administration,
especially in the field of conscription. Conscription, which formerly had no
specific pattern, and resulted in uneven distribution of levies from different
regions and/or different communities, was to be proportionate to the
population density. The soldiers were to be drafted in accordance with the
population of each locality. The matters on conscription was stated in the
Decree as:
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93 As a response to the wishes of peasants, the Council of Vidin exempted the
village of Tırnabofça, located in Niş and was ransacked by the Albanian bandits, from
payment of taxes due for the year of 1259/1843-4. These peasants had just returned to their
homelands. To this end, the Meclis-i Muhasebe-i Maliye (Council of Bookkeeping and
Finance), with the approval of the Ministry of Finance, requested from the High Council of
the State that the decision of the Council to be executed, since the assistance of the
villagers was necessary for the reconstruction of the village. Also, this would encourage the
other peasants, who had fled, to return to their village. This case was discussed in the
Meclis-i Vala and a decree of confirmation was ordered, and was valid as of the first day of
September of the same year. (BOA, İrade, Meclis-i Vala 1110 (5 Şaban [12]60/20 August
1844). Total amount of taxes they had to pay is 2749 kuruş.
94 In one case, Major General Mustafa Paşa was sent to bring back the fugitives,
who fled to the Albanian mountains. He was given the substantial sum of 15000 kuruş as
his travel allowances and together with a set of restrictions, he was expected to follow
[s]ome localities have been burdened beyond their capacity, and others
have provided fewer soldiers than they could, causing disorder as well as
damage to agriculture and trade, with their lifetime terms causing a lack
of energy in service as well as lessening of the population. Therefore, it is
necessary to establish suitable procedures for taking soldiers from the
localities when needed and to take them in rotation for terms of four or
five years.95
By this way, the central government wanted to encourage the
development of trade and agriculture of a given region. Further, the length
of military service was to be reduced to four or five years. The objective
was to prevent demoralization of the recruits and, as importantly, not to
interrupt their years of procreation.96 Although the active military service
was decreased to five to six years, people continued their military duties as
reserves, even after the end of real military service.97 The recruitment of
young rural population into army ranks reduced the number of peasant
cultivators in the countryside.
First attempts to reorganize the military began after 1830s. A redif
(reserve militia) system was introduced in 1834 during the reign of
                                                                                                                                                  
(BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 7224 (8 Rebiyyü'l-ahir [12]63/26 March 1846). Nevertheless, in the
same document there is no information on what these instructions were.
95 The transcription of the Tanzimat Decree can be found in Kaynar, pp. 172-3 and
Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi V, pp. 263-266. This English translation was quoted
from Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, p. 60 (emphasis mine).
96 For a brief summary of the articles and a comparison of the Decree with the
Declaration of Rights and some other European examples, see Ezel Kural Shaw, “Tanzimat
Provincial Reform as Compared with European Models”, in 150. Yılında Tanzimat
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992), 51-67.
97 Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, pp. 100ff.
Mahmud II.98 Shaw argues that Mahmut II’s aim was to convince the
population that this new system was to allow the population to “care for
their own security while providing a pool of trained men who could be
brought to war more rapidly and effectively than had been the case in the
past.”99 Redif batallions were established in every province in accordance
with the population densities.100 They were commanded by müşirs (field
marshals, or valis), but in order to gain the support of the local population
the majors, lieutenants, and colonels were appointed among the sons of the
local notables and elites and regular salaries were paid to these officers.101
After 1835, with the need for a direct centralized control over these
battalions and the opening up of a new military school, the sons of the local
notables and elites were sent to their homes and replaced with Ottoman
military officials.102 This reorganization did not satisfy local notables and
elites and therefore they broke off their support. The number of redifs failed
to keep up the government demands for enrollment.103 However, the
experience of this first step to modern conscription provided a basis for the
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100 These battalions were established three to four in every district and ten to
twelve in every province (Mustafa Nuri Paşa, Netayic ül-Vukuat. Kurumları ve
Örgütleriyle Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992), p. 298-
9) [hereafter cited as: Mustafa Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat]. Shaw says that in the beginning
there would be 40 battalions, one for each district, in total with approximately 57,000
redifs. But, in 1836 the system was reorganized. This time with 120 battalions, three for
each district, and 100,000 men. (Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, pp. 43-4).
101 Mustafa Nuri, Netayic ül-Vukuat, p. 298.
102 Ibid.
103 Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, p. 44.
development of provincial armies and local police forces later during the
Tanzimat.104
After 1840s, local police forces (zaptiye) were established in every
district that was included within the Tanzimat reforms. These forces were
responsible from escorting the collection of taxes and providing the
necessary means for security of population, travelers, roads, and bridges. In
the beginning, the state employed local militia, retinues, irregulars, old
bandits and vagabonds as security forces, when needed, in maintaining
order and in the collection of local taxes. However, some of their
applications increased the resentments of peasants. During the eighteenth
and the early nineteenth centuries, the Bosnian Muslims and the Albanian
tribesmen were usually employed as retinues in the Ottoman army.105 Up to
the conscription policies after Tanzimat, these mercenaries remained a
threat both to the well-being of state and of society.106 The bureaucrats of
the Ministry of War and the representatives in the Meclis-i Ahkam-ı Adliye
soon came to the conclusion that if the police reforms were continued to be
implemented in this manner, persons who were formerly employed in the
retinues of military commanders, müsellims (local collectors of the taxes
and tithes) and mültezims (contractors) would become unemployed and
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impoverished. Furthermore, the members of the local reserve or militia
were prevented from engaging in agriculture and public improvements.
Thus, the practice of employing local reserves or militia as gendarmerie
force was abolished and persons who were formerly in the service of
military commanders, local collectors of taxes and tithes, and contractors
began to be employed.107 In 1846, Sultan Abdülmecid advised the Meclis-i
Ahkam-ı Adliye (Supreme Judicial Council) to reorganize these police
forces, since in the Bulgarian provinces they were acting in opposition to
the Tanzimat requirements.108 However, nothing changed until the end of
the Vidin revolt, when the local police forces in Vidin were abolished.109
 Except for collection of taxes and for maintenance of local security,
police force was implemented also to suppress the bandits.110 In most cases,
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109 Halil İnalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1992),
pp. 79-80 and Pinson, Ottoman Bulgaria, p. 114. An interesting example was the case of a
kocabaşı. The kocabaşı (headman of Christian community) of a region nearby the Greek
border complained about the Greek bandits, who had destroyed and stolen his property. He
asked for a compensation for his damages and permission for hiring militia against those
Greek bandits. The government decided to pay compensation, but decreased the payment
that was demanded by the kocabaşı. Also, the government gave permission for hiring sixty-
eight mercenaries among the derbends, who became unemployed after the military reforms
and conscription policies, and undertook the salary payments of these guards (BOA, İrade,
Dahiliye 5262 (28 Şevval [12]60/10 November 1844). The kocabaşı demanded 20,000
kuruş for his damages and 550 kuruş monthly salary for each guard. But the government
decided to pay 15, 000 kuruş for a compensation and 300 kuruş monthly payment for each
derbend.
110 For example, the secret agent of the governor of Silistre reported the
appearance of bandits on the shores of Vidin, Rusçuk ve Silistre. These bandits were using
force against the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects; they were killing the people and
seizing their properties. The secret agent’s investigation revealed that a man called Hüseyin
with his seven or eight companions was responsible for the disturbance. This group had
engaged in brigandage for nearly two years in the vicinities of Niğbolu, Rahova and
Ziştovi. One and a half months before the last incident they also ransacked a village very
close to Ziştovi, and an island on the Tuna and captured the boats of the Serbian fishermen.
the central government rewarded the gendarmerie of a district for their
performance in driving away the bandits who attacked villages and travelers
and seized their property. This reward was usually a substantial atiyye-i
seniyye (gift granted by the Sultan).111 In other cases, high officials were
honored by the title kapucıbaşılık (official representative of the government
in the provinces). For example, the müşir (field marshal/governor) of
Rumeli, his mühürdar (private secretary), and the mütesellim (local
contractor of taxes and tithes) of İlbasan sancak (subdivision of a province)
were all titled with kapucıbaşılık, when they succeeded in suppressing a big
revolt of a number of villages included within the sancak.112 About four or
five thousand başıbozuks (irregulars) were gathered around from the Rumeli
vilayets (provinces) to supress and punish the revolters and reestablish the
order. The major demand of the revolters was not to pay the taxes to the
mütesellim Derviş Ağa and his nephew, the deputy collector in the districts
of the revolt, Esad Ağa. In the end, the revolt was suppressed and the
                                                                                                                                                  
Finally, the agent of the governor, accompanied by the gendarmerie of the province and
with the help of a certain Ahmet Ağa and his men, defeated those bandits and gave back
the boats of the fishermen. (BOA, İrade, Meclis-i Vala 4475 (29 Cumade’l-ahir [12]60/16
July 1844)).
111 BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 4507 (29 Rebiyyü’l-evvel [12]60/18 April 1844). The
amount of these gifts sometimes could be very high. For instance, the militia of the tax
collector of the Za‘ra-i Cedid district of Filibe had lost some of their horses and their
clothes and their guns were destroyed in a skirmish with bandits. It was said that their loss
was worth about six to seven thousand kuruş. The losses of these persons were
compensated. Actually this amount was a very high cost for the conditions of the period,
especially in view of the fact that there were only four bandits involved and two were killed
and the other two managed to escape wounded. Even a moderate village’s total amount of
taxes was not more than the half of this cost.
112 BOA, İrade, Dahiliye 147 (13 Şaban [12]55/22 October 1839).
accused ones were killed by those başıbozuks, causing more resentment
among the people against the tax collector and his irregulars.113
 The actions of these irregulars were not the sole contentious element
causing public resentments. Occasionally, the local landowners and
merchants were accused of disturbing the peace. For example, in Bosnia,
the government was anxious that the violent oppressions of these groups, if
continued, would attract the attention of foreign powers, and affect the
internal tranquility of the region, and if dispersed to other places, the well
being of the subjects would be threatened. Thus, the government ordered
the high officials of the provinces to take necessary police measures to
prevent the oppressions by using the gendarmerie under their command. In
the end, the local authorities managed to suppress these groups and
reestablished the order.114
Banditry
As ‘social control’ became more visible at the local level with the
spread of Tanzimat reforms in rural areas, the central government was
inclined to protect the population from banditry.
In the official documents, the general denomination for bandits is
eşkıya. But often they are also called as haşerat (mobs, rabbles, beasts,or
vagabonds), hubaşat (incongruous persons collected together), havene
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(traitors, evildoers, or scoundrels), erbab-ı hıyanet ü şekevat (the people of
high treason) and the like.115 The bandits attacked villages, killed people
and animals, and stole properties of villagers. They also destroyed crops and
took hostages. The bandits not only stole money, horses, guns and
confiscate property of the people, but also lifted mürur tezkeresi (permit to
travel) and cizye evrakı (documents of head tax). They generally run away
to the nearest mountain, forest, or wasteland where they could go into
hiding very easily.116 Usually, the local police forces followed the
insurgents joined by a group of local fellows (chosen among the poor and
needy), who knew the region well. They got a mürasele-i şer‘i (an official
letter) from the kadı (judge), which explains the aim of the pursuit and the
crimes of the rebels. When these insurgents captured, the stolen objects and
property were registered in a document, which is called an ilam, or
mazbata, that was sent from the local council of the district (kaza meclisi)
and then the captured items were returned to their owners and registered in
these official documents. The zabtiyes and fellows always received an
atiyye-i seniyye (gift from the Sultan), in the shape of money or property.117
There were three functions of these gift. First, it could be a compensation
for the losses during the pursuit, i.e. horses, clothes, money, or guns.
Second, it was an act of displaying a pattern of loyalty for the other parts of
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the population. That is, if they had helped the government in its efforts for
establishing authority in the provinces, they would have been rewarded.
Third, it could constitute a threat for the rebels to change their mind.
The end stage of an harmful attack was usually the displacement of
villagers.118 But sometimes the people of a region joined these bandits and
acted together against the oppresssions of landowners and tax demands of
the government.119 This latter form of banditry was the most difficult one
for the state to suppress. The greatest revolts of this kind was emerged in
Niş (1840) and Vidin (1851).
Between 1840 and 1850, two major revolts, namely Niş and Vidin,
besides some minor uprisings that occurred elsewhere in the Balkans,120
threatened the Ottoman control in the Balkans and the practicality of
Tanzimat reforms. The revolt of Niş occurred partly because of the unjust
assessments of newly reformed tax levies and partly because of the
malpractices of local officials.121 To suppress the rebels, the governor of Niş
sent irregular Albanian troops (başıbozuks), who further increased
resentments of the peasants. The Albanian irregulars not only terrorized
peasants and poor people, but also confiscated their property. Although they
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Şevval [12]59/22 October 1843); BOA, İrade, Dahiliye, 4460 (8 Receb [12]60/25 July
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121 Pinson, Ottoman Bulgaria, 103-7 and İnalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi,
pp. 30-3.
were paid salaries and were given ration from the government, they
provided food for themselves and fodder for their animals from the villagers
by force.122 Then, approximately ten thousand people fled to Serbia.123
When these events were heard in İstanbul, the müşir (field marshal) in
Rumeli was sent to suppress the Albanian troops, to secure the area, and to
bring back emigrants and to return their property, which was seized by these
irregulars. Finally, the military officials convinced the emigrants to return
their homes by giving certain concessions and guarantees. However, the
situation of the peasantry did not change too much and emigration to Serbia
continued.124 On the part of the government, such emigrations meant the
loss of laborers and taxpayers, which increased labor scarcity and
diminished state’s income. Thus, the central government tried to find
further remedies to gain the loyalty of subjects. By that time, also French,
Russian, and Austrian governments sent special agents to control the
situation and to inform their governments on the nature of uprisings.125
Additionally, Austrian and Russian governments feared from the spread of
resentments “among those segments of their population living closest to the
Ottoman lands”.126 These put the Ottoman government in a position to
compete with foreign demands over the protection of local non-Muslims.
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About a decade later, the Vidin upheaval broke out moderately
because of the same reasons of the Niş revolt. The causes of Vidin revolt
were irregularities in tax distribution and landholding practices, improper
administration on the part of the government officials and the like. Peasants
usually complained about the oppressions of tax farmers, landowners, and
local civil and military officials.127 By this time, the central government
ordered the local officials to convince the insurgents without using force.
But, if they could not be successful in persuading, then they could
implement only regular army forces, not the başıbozuks (irregulars).
Nevertheless, the local landowners had already been gathered a group of
irregulars to suppress the revolt, which further augmented peasants’
discontent.128 Later on, many oppressed peasants fled to Serbia. The first
operation of the regular army that was sent from İstanbul was to destroy the
başıbozuk forces.129 The government promised that no punishment would
be applied to those villagers, who returned their homelands. After certain
negotiations, the representative of the central government in the region
persuaded the emigrants to return their villages.130
To sum up, the post-Tanzimat Ottoman state did implement new
modern policies to suppress the revolts and secure the population from
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bandit attacks. These policies sought to recruit large numbers of young men
for the army as well as for local security forces to be employed against the
would-be rebels. However, the irregulars led by the local landowners and
tax-farmers contradicted with the central government’s policies of
protection the population from violent oppressions. Simply because of the
population policies of the state, these forces of local landowners were to be
eliminated in order to secure the subjects’ loyalty and to provide necessary
means for maintaining their means of subsistence. Thus, the introduction of
centrally organized police force in the process of collecting taxes and
protection of population was crucial for the Ottoman state. For planning and
building an education program, the government imported French military
officials to serve in the police force. For instance, état majeur officers came
to İstanbul from Paris to sketch a modern plan for the organization of the
local police forces on modern techniques.131 Furthermore, these policies put
more burdens on the central treasury and could not override the
contradictions, which were inherent in the system.
Policies of Protection on Education and Sanitation
The other Tanzimat reform on the protection of population
concerned the study of arts and sciences and matters of public education.
That is to say, it was about the regulations of primary and high schools, and
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universities. For this aim, three reports were prepared and provisional funds
and appointments were arranged. Apart from some small expenses, this
reform was also postponed, for sketching out necessary resolutions, until
the regulations of public contribution tax.132 The success of the reforms in
education and the generalization of educational institutions were also
dependent on the rearrangement of taxes and on the reconstruction of the
countryside.
The cholera in 1831 and the plague in 1836 threatened the Empire.
The government took some modern sanitary measures for the first time in
the history of the Ottoman Empire.133 They were not very effective, and the
problems continued. In 1836, special decrees were sent to the military
officials in Rumeli in order to take measures for controlling the spread of
epidemics. Finally, in May 1838, the high officials, high ranking soldiers,
religious persons gathered to discuss the sanitary problems and to shape a
sanitary policy for the Empire.134 In 9 May 1838, an imperial order was
issued in Takvim-i Vekayi (the official newspaper), which mentioned the
importance of the development of sanitary facilities. According to this
decree, it was necessary to provide remedies to these diseases which can
improve the health, contribute to the prolongation of life expectancy, and
increase the population of the Empire, thus, its power, trade, and resources
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and also to make its finance more prosper.135 To this aim, the first lazaret
was opened in 28 December 1838. These policies occurred at irregular
intervals and were limited only to scattered localities, and they accelerated
only after the Tanzimat. Between 1839 and 1941, sixteen new lazarets and
sanitary offices were added,136 the majority being in the Balkan territories
of the Empire. In 1850, all frontier regions of the Empire were covered
with sanitary offices.137 The Sanitary Council of the Ottoman Empire was
established in 9 December 1838 under the reign of Mahmud II.138
Consequently, after the proclamation of the Tanzimat, the sanitary council
became the Supreme Council of the Health of the Porte (Meclis-i Tahaffuz-ı
Devlet-i Aliyye).139 This council furnished to guide the sanitary offices in
the localities and to aid in sanitary matters to local authorities, whose
earlier efforts had been impeded by lack of a central authority. The council
had the authority to establish new local sanitary offices and lazarets and to
investigate sanitary conditions in particular districts. The major
responsibilities of this council were to regulate sanitary policies of the
government, to prevention and control of the spread of epidemics, and to
establish quarantine administration in critical regions.140
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Panzac argues that the origin of the Ottoman state’s sanitary policies
was the realization of the demographic insufficiency and the effects of
epidemics, such as plague and cholera.141 Thus, the acknowledgement of
demographic insufficiency due to the military factors had been accentuated
with the epidemics,142 which forced the Ottoman government to implement
modern policies for protecting the health of the people.
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II. THE PROCREATION OF POPULATION
Some of the contemporary writings on population growth will be a
guideline for discussing the Ottoman politics of procreation during the
immediate post-Tanzimat period. Before dealing with the policies of
procreation and numerical data on the population growth of the Ottoman
state, I will discuss the main arguments of Thomas Malthus, Namık Kemal
and Hyde Clarke to evaluate abstract and concrete dimensions of the
Ottoman population growth. Both historians and demographers have come
to see the Malthusian model as explanatory for the pre-industrial states
since the 1960s.143 Kemal, as an Ottoman subject, and Clarke,144 living in
the Ottoman Empire as a foreigner, will be helpful for understanding how
the Ottoman population problem was perceived by the contemporaries.
The common belief among these contemporaries that the Ottoman
population decreased during the first half of the nineteenth century is partly
misleading.145 Malthus claimed that there was a relative decline in the
Ottoman population, which began in the last quarter of the eighteenth
                                                          
143 Robert Woods, “The Population of Britain in the Nineteenth Century”, in
British Population History: From Black Death to the Present Day, Michael Anderson (ed)
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 281-358, p. 293.
144 Clarke was a fellow of the German Oriental Society. He stayed in the Ottoman
state for some time; he worked with Ahmet Vefik Efendi and Suphi Bey (Clarke, Hyde.
“On the Supposed Extinction of the Turks and Increase of the Christians in Turkey”,
Journal of Statistical Society of London 28:2 (Jun., 1865), 261-93 [JSTOR,
http://www.jstor.org/, October 6, 2000], p. 261)[hereafter cited as: Clarke, “On the
Supposed Extinction”] and compiled statistical data on the Muslim and the Christian
population of the Ottoman Empire.
145 Karpat, Ottoman Population, p. 11.
century and continued up to the early nineteenth century.146 Kemal, a
successor of Malthusian assumptions, argues that the population of the
Ottoman Empire was decreasing since the time of Suleiman the
Magnificent.147 On the other hand, Clarke follows a different argument.
Although he did not have reliable statistics, except for the ones that were
provided by some Ottoman state officials, he argued that the Ottoman
population was neither decreasing nor increasing. Therefore, each of these
three writers provides a good opportunity for comparing the European and
Ottoman viewpoints on the population problem.
A Critique of Malthusian Population Theory
In 1798 Malthus published An Essay on the Principle of Population
as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the
Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers. He revised
the ideas in this first edition of the Essay in subsequent editions until
1826.148 His main argument in the first edition of the Essay is that the
population growth follows a geometrical order while food supplies could
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154 [hereafter cited as: Malthus, “Population in the Turkish Dominions”]
147 Namık Kemal, “Nüfus”, İbret 9 (25 June 1872), in Namık Kemal ve İbret
Gazetesi, 2nd edition, Mustafa Nihat Özön (ed) (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1997), 72-
85, p. 77 [hereafter cited as: Namık Kemal, “Nüfus”].
148 E. A. Wrigley, “The Limits to Growth: Malthus and the Classical Economists”,
Population and Development Review 14, Issue Supplement: Population and Resources in
Western Intellectual Traditions (1988b), 30-48, p. 32 [hereafter cited as: Wrigley, “Limits
to Growth”].
only increase at an arithmetical rate.149 To illustrate this argument, he
collected information on the population growth of the United States, which
had been estimated that its population was doubling in less than twenty-five
years.150 In his article “Population”, Kemal ascertains this Malthusian
argument and claims that in the absence of extraordinary crises, the
Ottoman population can double in size in about twenty-five years.151 For
further explanation, let us notate the initial population as x and food
supplies as x'. In twenty-five years, population becomes 2x and food
supplies 2x'. It is clear that there is no problem for this period, since
population and food supplies increased synchronously. However, after fifty
years they become 4x and 3x', and after hundred years, population and food
supplies become 16x and 5x', respectively. If we assume that population is
doubling in twenty-five years, it means that in a century, population will be
3.2 times larger than food supplies. Thus, 11x of the population will be
victimized by misery, famine, and disease after the turn of the century.
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150 Woods, “Population of Britain”, p. 291.
151 This rate, he concludes, emerged from a six or seven fold increase in the
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To illustrate this, Kemal follows a different path and reaches the same conclusion as
Malthus: He argues that for a period of twenty years -other things being equal- a healthy
married couple is naturally capable of producing at least one child a year. As such, this
family would include twenty-two persons within twenty years. This means that in two
years, the original couple doubles and becomes four. Thus, for him, if the Ottoman subjects
followed the laws of nature, the Ottoman state would be able to reach to the level of
economic growth of western states by increasing its population.
According to Malthus, this is the fundamental check to population
growth.152
But, in order to attain a clear understanding of the nineteenth
century population growth in the Ottoman empire, I will discuss other
Malthusian assumptions on the population problem that were exposed in
later editions of the Essay. First of these assumptions is the checks to
population growth. These are classified as ‘positive’ and ‘preventive’
checks. ‘Positive’ checks are war, famine, disease, unhealthy working and
inappropriate labor and weather conditions, extreme poverty, poor
childbearing, big cities, and excesses of all kinds. People have no control
over ‘positive’ checks.153 On the other hand, people can keep pace or
decrease population growth by implementing voluntary ‘preventive’ checks.
Malthus ascribed the far lower rates of European population growth to
‘preventive’ checks, giving special emphasis to late marriage patterns of
Western Europe. The other ‘preventive’ checks, which he mentioned, were
birth control, abortion, infanticide, adultery, and homosexuality. He
                                                          
152 Woods, “Population of Britain”, p. 292.
153 ibid., p. 292 and David Price, “Of Population and False Hopes: Malthus and
His Legacy”, Population and Environment 19:3, 1-10[http://www.news.cornell.
edu/releases/March98/Malthus_legacy. html] Reached 25. 09. 2000, p. 3 [hereafter cited
as: Price, “Malthus and His Legacy”]. Kemal also mentions these ‘positive’ checks. They
are the bad weather conditions and insufficient dressing that could not prevent the body
from weather conditions, dirtiness of households and quarters, disability in protecting the
bodily health, bad nutrition, moral corruption, excess consumption of alcohol and tobacco,
wars and contentions, lack of planning in the administration of wealth, grief and internal
constipation, and abortion. On the other hand, the ‘preventive’ checks are addiction to
drinking and dissipation, various sexual practices, prostitution, and polygamy. Among
these ‘positive’ and ‘preventive’ checks not growing enough trees and polluting lakes or
water supplies, which help the freshness of weather, the dirtiness of households and
considered these checks as immoral.154 For Malthus, those societies that
ignored the imperative for moral restraints, such as delayed marriage and
celibacy for adults until they were economically able to support their
children, would suffer the horrible ‘positive’ checks of war, famine, and
epidemics. From this concern about the sufferings from ‘positive’ checks,
Malthus warned that poor laws (legal measures that provided relief to the
poor) and generosity must not cause their beneficiaries to relax their moral
restraint or increase their fertility.155
Malthus mentioned that production involved the two of three factors
of production: land and labor.156 For him, an uncontrolled population
growth would put a pressure on land available for agriculture, which its
supply was fixed, and therefore production could not catch up with
increasing population.157 Central to this argument is Malthus’s formulation
of the ‘law of declining marginal returns’ on land. Concisely, this refers to
the thesis Malthus put forward in the first edition of the Essay. That is,
means of subsistence could not grow as rapid as population. At this point,
Malthus shares the same view that the fixed supply of cultivable land is the
                                                                                                                                                  
quarters both in the cities and villages effected the population growth in the Ottoman
Empire more than others (Namık Kemal, “Nüfus”, pp. 79-80).
154 Woods, “Population of Britain”, p. 292.
155 George R. Boyer, “Malthus Was Right After All: Poor Relief and Birth Rates
in Southeastern England”, The Journal of Political Economy 97:1 (Feb., 1989), 93-114.
[hereafter cited as: Boyer, “Malthus Was Right After All”].
156 Wrigley, “Limits to Growth”, pp. 33-4.
157 Ibid., p. 33.
core principle of declining marginal returns, with Smith and Ricardo.158
However, at the same time, he challenged the arguments of the
mercantilists’ that the number of people determined the nation’s wealth and
the physiocrats’ argument that the wealth determined the numbers of
people.159
Malthus’s assumptions did not rely on feasible empirical data.160
Thus, some of his discussions remain mere speculations on the main trends
of population growth in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, there is not
sufficient data on the size; growth, fertility and mortality rates; migration;
and age-sex composition of the Ottoman state for the first half of the
nineteenth century. However, it is still possible to challenge some of the
Malthusian assumptions on population growth in pre-industrial states, the
Ottoman Empire as being one of them, by showing solid examples from the
archival documents.
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First, Malthusian model was operated through death rates rather than
birth rates.161 But, to understand the growth rate of the Ottoman population,
we need to evaluate fertility rates.162 As Wrigley and his colleagues
mention, rural marriages and fertility strictly responded to changing
economic conditions throughout history.163 Even though there is very
limited information on the very character of pre-industrial controls of
fertility, Tilly argues that the control of fertility did not emerge after full-
fledged industrialization.164 Fertility rates rose and fell repeatedly in the pre-
industrial states.165 Thus, it is very difficult to find an exact rate. Moreover,
the validity of the Malthusian ‘positive’ checks (i.e. war, famine, and
epidemics), which caused major shifts in population growth, has been
greatly challenged after the development of historical demography.166
Second, due to the high land/labor ratio, there was not an important
population pressure on land in the Ottoman Empire. The ratio of total land
under cultivation to rural population was considerably high, especially for
the first half of the nineteenth century, that is before the massive territorial
loses. Thus, in order to eliminate the labor shortage in agriculture, the
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Ottoman government directed its efforts to restrict peasant movements and
to increase population.
Namık Kemal and Clarke on Ottoman Population Growth
Namık Kemal was very much influenced from the western political
economists’ views on population growth, especially Malthus’s. His major
concern was to discover the causes of the so-called population decline in the
Ottoman Empire and to suggest certain remedies for driving away the
reasons for population decrease. He argues that if the government wants to
eliminate impediments that hinders the population growth, it should treat
the natural law of population increase as an everyday practice, then
theoretically, in about twenty five or at most in fifty or sixty years, the
Ottoman state could manage to increase its population. For him, the security
of the Ottoman state and its independence from the sanctions of western
powers depended on the population size, which should not fall much behind
the European states’. Population growth was to become the major concern
of the Ottoman government, since it actually had the potential to increase
demand for agricultural production.167
Kemal argues that the means of subsistence, such as agriculture,
trade, and crafts, could not increase in step with population growth.168
                                                          
167 Namık Kemal, “Nüfus”, p. 82.
168 In fact, Kemal wants to illustrate the Malthusian geometric increase in
population in a popular manner. Malthus argues that while the population increases
geometrically (1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32), food supplies increase only arithmetically (1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
Agricultural production only supplies the demands of consumers and could
not be preserved. Considering land has a fixed boundary, population was to
be increased to such a level that each person would have enough land in
order to secure his means of subsistence, and accordingly reproduce. For
Kemal the major ‘preventive’ checks to population growth is mortality.169
Nevertheless land could not feed such a population increase even mortality
rate is high, because its supply and productivity are limited.
According to Kemal, industrial production is not possible without
agricultural supplies. Further, the commercial capital could not derive profit
to the extent that it can double in two years like population.170 For Kemal,
there is only one thing in the world that increases in step with population,
namely interest, especially the debt taken with compound interest. It is not
possible to make a living by transactions made out of interest, because they
do not guarantee means of subsistence. Kemal avows that disgusting things
like interest and usury, which are contrary to eternal justice and human
nature, will be totally abolished. All these remarks lead him to end with a
conclusion pertaining to the population growth in the West. He argues that
although the population growth in Europe is sustained by many factors, its
main cause is the influence of the subsistence requirements of workers.
                                                                                                                                                  
6). From this observation, he concludes that an uncontrolled population growth will cause
shortage of food, poverty, and social unrest.
169 His estimation that natural deaths are merely one fifteenth of natural births is
very naïve.
170There is however an exception to this proposition: the merchants who gain a
hundred percent profit from selling their goods. For Kemal, their profit is not coming from
commercial activities, but from theft (Namık Kemal, “Nüfus”, p. 75).
Against the political economists’ treatises on the rules and causes of the
population growth, Kemal argues that their attempts to find means for
setting a limit to population growth depended on the precautions taken by
the citizens, not on abstract formulations of political economists. At this
point, he was trying to put the ‘moral restraint’ as the major check to
population growth, which is contradicted with his former discussions.
For Kemal, the population growth is not a crucial problem for the
Ottoman state.171 He suggests that the most prominent duty of Ottoman
subjects is to procreate. For him, the Ottoman state is suffering disastrous
crisis from the insufficient population. He argues that spending time and
money for the construction of railroads and the opening up new public
schools in the most deserted parts of the Empire is wasteful. Moreover,
Kemal claims that almost eighty percent of the total agricultural lands, once
prosperous, are now remaining uncultivated. If they were not opened to
agriculture immediately, there would occur a subsistence crisis.172 He
explains that for about two hundred and fifty years, the Ottoman state
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suffered from ‘positive’ checks like wars, plagues, and rebellions. The
combination of such factors caused population decline in the Ottoman
Empire. However, he claims that since the Tanzimat, there were relatively
less oppressions, epidemics, and wars, so the population of the Ottoman
state was neither decreasing nor remaining stable.
Another discussion of the period was the Muslim and non-Muslim
population growth in the Ottoman Empire. It was believed that non-
Muslims were rapidly increasing at the expense of the Muslims. One reason
was being the restriction of military service only to Muslims. Kemal
confidentially believes that the non-Muslims cannot outnumber the
Muslims. Put differently, the Muslim population would not decrease to a
level that it would threaten the existence of the Ottoman polity. He thinks
that military service was to be extended to non-Muslims. In fact,
conscription was made compulsory for non-Muslims in 1855, but it was not
put into effect until late in the nineteenth century.173 He continues searching
for the causes that prevent the population growth in the Ottoman state.
Kemal argues that Malthusian concepts of ‘positive’ and ‘preventive’
checks to population growth as universal in the Ottoman territories. For
example, the spread of epidemics is one of the major causes for population
decline. There, he adds, the public health and police departments of the state
had to issue proper rules and regulations to prevent the spread of epidemics.
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Clarke disagrees with Kemal. He argues that epidemics ceased to be
exist for a long time, therefore it could not be a cause for the population
decline. On the other side, plague could be a cause for the displacement of
population.174 For Kemal, increasing agricultural production was essential
to feed more people. Thus, vineyards and tobacco fields were to be
transferred to grain production in order to prevent the excess consumption
of alcohol and tobacco.
The critique made by some Europeans175 on polygamy that prevent
the population growth in the Ottoman Empire refuted by both Kemal and
Clarke, but on different grounds. For Kemal, this is an example of the lack
of knowledge on obstacles that hinder population growth. For him, a
suggestion that one woman’s quality of giving birth is higher than three or
four women’s potential of reproducing is inconceivable. On the other hand,
Clarke claims that the practice of polygamy might be disadvantageous, but
it was not a sufficient cause for the population decline. In addition, he
claims after the Tanzimat reforms, which brought safety for life and
property, the polygamy declined. There is empirical testimony on this
statement. Todorov’s calculations for some major cities in the Balkans
revealed that polygamy was not widespread among the Muslim
population.176 Further, the poverty of the lower classes was effective on
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checks on polygamy, thus it might be better to think that polygamy mostly
exists among the upper and political classes.177 Based on his interviews, he
claims that in places where polygamy is still practiced, it does not assist
permanent population growth. Although crude birth rates were high, the
number of surviving children is very few.178 In reality, fertility and
mortality rates were high among the Muslim population in the Balkans.179
Further, he adds that there is no evidence from history, which proves that
polygamy has provided population growth more than monogamy.180
In the third edition of the Essay in 1806, 181 Malthus interprets
contemporary accounts of the travelers on rural checks to population and
tries to identify the causes of rural depopulation in the Ottoman Empire. He
argues that this phenomenon depends on the corruption of local institutional
arrangements, not to inefficient procreation or to insufficient agricultural
technology. Even though the Ottoman Empire had a large territory, the
fundamental cause of the depopulation is the nature of the Ottoman
government.182 In opposition to Malthus, Clarke argues that the farming of
land tax might leave peasants to deprivation and oppression of the tax-
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179 Justin McCarthy, “Muslims in Ottoman Europe: Population from 1800 to
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farmers and their dependents. But, the government, without any efficient
power of protection, is trying to prevent the oppressions and formerly
abolished tax farming in the Balkans.183 After Mahmut II’s subjugation of
provincial ayans at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Clarke says that
privileged mansions and establishments were abandoned, and this caused a
negligible decline in the population of the Turks for a short period of time,
at least when local and military authority weakened. However, there was
displacement of population.184 He adds that if one accepts that the Ottoman
government is defective and irrational and is not successful in just
administration, then how one can explain the reasons for massive
immigration from Persia, Russia, Wallachia, Austria, Greece, and the Ionian
islands and Malta to the Ottoman empire.185
In short, in opposition to Malthusian argument, Kemal was well
aware of the fact that population growth and agricultural improvement via
increased productivity can be thought together. However, his reliance on
Malthusian assumptions prevented him to draw a better picture of the
population issue in the Ottoman Empire. However, his argument that trade
and manufactures can be developed through agricultural improvement and
population growth is vital.186 Modern scholarship showed that there was a
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186 Kemal’s mentor Şinasi wrote in 1861 that the productive land was the only
genuine source of wealth and trade and industry existed for the transfer of agricultural
products. In his article Ottoman Public Exhibition, he remarked that although a developed
industry is very crucial for a country’s prosperity, the means of subsistence and the source
strong connection between the development of rural industry and population
growth.187 In the Ottoman case, rural industry was developed in the
Balkans, where there were higher population densities.188
Different from Malthus and Kemal, Clarke argues that a steady
increase in population requires an increase in territory and in food supplies
within the limits of natural law of procreation.189
Control and Regulation of Population Growth
Because land was plenty and population was few in the Ottoman
Empire, the government considered the population growth as one of the
primary causes of prosperity.190 In order to encourage population growth,
the government proclaimed couples that marriage and procreation was
legitimate and respected, before both canon and civil law. In this respect,
the High Council of the State issued many decrees (irades) to promote
marriage and reproduction. The efforts to establish a central control over the
marriages began during the first years of the Tanzimat period.191
                                                                                                                                                  
of wealth of the Ottoman state rested on its agricultural produces. He offered the
government officials and wealthy people to buy the British agricultural tools displayed in
this exhibition and utilized modern agricultural techniques in order to improve the amount
of agricultural produce of the Ottoman Empire (Hikmet Dizdaroğlu (ed), Şinasi: Hayatı,
Sanatı, Eserleri (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınevi, 1954).
187 Tilly, “Vital Processes”, p. 27.
188 Palairet, Balkan Economies, chapters 2 and 3.
189 Clarke, “Of the Extinction”, p. 278.
190 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845); BOA, İrade, Cevdet Adliye
825, Lef 1 (23 Cumade’l-ahir [12]60/10 July 1844); BOA, İrade, Cevdet Adliye 825, Lef 2
(29 Cumade’l-ahire [12]60/16 July 1844).
191 BOA, İrade, Mesail-i Mühimme 58 ([12]61/1845); BOA, İrade, Mesail-i
Mühimme 78 ([12]61/1845).
The legal definition of a marriage was made by an official
document, called izinname (document of permission), issued by local judge
(kadı).192 The fees of these izinnames (documents of permission) were
differentiated from region to region. Even in some places, the fees were too
high that people abstained from marriage. The government fixed these fees
of marriage contracts throughout the Empire to three kuruş (piastre) for
virgins and two kuruş for widows by a firman issued in 5 Receb [12]66/17
May 1850.193 The permission for marriages were to be taken from the local
judge in order to authenticate that there was no religious and administrative
obstacles for couples to marry.194 For example, marriage was prohibited for
foster children and for couples who had blood relations with each other.
Marriages among extended families, like cousin-cousin marriages, were
also forbidden due to the policies of procreation of the Ottoman Empire and
religious concerns. The couples were to get the approval of their relatives.
The Ottoman government established a direct proportional connection
between marriage and procreation. That is to say, marriage meant to have
children. However, there were customary practices among people, which
contradicted this formulation of marriage. For instance, there were marital
birth control methods within families, which the central government desired
to manipulate.
                                                          
192 Duben and Behar emphasizes that in practice the Muslim population did not
take into consideration these izinnames. Then, they argue that that might have been true for
the countryside (Duben and Behar, İstanbul Haneleri, p. 123).
Duben and Behar argue that though there is information on coitus
interruptus and other birth control methods used in the countryside, there is
no enough information on whether these methods practiced regularly or not.
They add that the common fertility form in the countryside was, what
demographers called, the “natural fertility”. They conclude that after all the
people in the rural areas knew the birth control methods, but they did not
practice them due to social and economic reasons.195 However, a decree
issued by the government displayed that people in the countryside practiced
birth control widely. Such customary practices (görenek)196, which the
government officials viewed with distaste and preferred not to discuss in
documents, were common in most pre-industrial societies.197 The Ottoman
subjects resisted the policies of procreation and pressures coming from the
central government in many ways. The control of fertility within marriage
was an important one. This might take the form of coitus interruptus or
reservatus, of abortions and of infanticide.198 These were not novel
                                                                                                                                                  
193 BOA, A. MKT. UM. 10/85 (23 Receb [12]66/4 June 1850). This irade displays
a tendency for including the kadı courts into Tanzimat reforms as an object of regulation.
194 Duben and Behar, İstanbul Haneleri, pp. 121-3.
195 Duben and Behar, İstanbul Haneleri, p. 14.
196 The word görenek literally means in Turkish “a precedent; a knowledge seen or
experienced; a method”.
197 Le Roy Ladurie calls such kind of methods and practices as “sinful secrets” of
contraception. See Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, The Territory of the Historian. Trans. from
the French by Ben and Siân Reynolds (Sussex: The Harvester Press Limited, 1979), p. 241.
Ladurie displays that during the French warfare activities and conscription policies of the
Revolution and the Empire between 1789 and 1813 “sinful secrets” of contraception spread
out rapidly within the French countryside, causing significant decline in fertility rates
(idem, p. 252).
198 Quataert, “Age of Reforms”, p. 790 and for the same phenomenon in Europe,
see E. A. Wrigley, Continuity, Chance and Change: The Character of the Industrial
customs, but experienced throughout centuries. In a period of where modern
contraceptive methods were unknown, it became a kind of tradition among
rural and well-to-do parts of the population. As Wrigley mentions, these
control methods were already known by people, but brought into use when
the necessary and sufficient conditions emerged.199 Even in the age of
condoms and other modern medical techniques, coitus interruptus is still
one of the most common methods implemented by people to control
fertility. On the other hand, it is a technique, unlike the other cultural
methods, which can spread among people without propaganda. That is, each
couple could invent it by themselves.200 However, if this is so, the Ottoman
officials might have seen it as part of a wider tradition. Another method for
controlling fertility is leaving proper time intervals between one child and
the next, which was common throughout history. Besides, certain traditional
techniques and practices were adapted for birth control.201 Hatcher and his
colleagues summarize these traditional factors that might decrease fertility
in any given traditional society. First is the promotion of lengthened breast-
feed. Even today this is one of the most important methods of contraception
                                                                                                                                                  
Revolution in England (Cambridge [England] and New York: Cambridge University Press,
1988).
199 E. A. Wrigley, People, Cities and Wealth: The Transformation of Traditional
Society (Oxford, UK; New York, NY, USA: Blackwell, 1987), p. 265 [hereafter cited as:
Wrigley: People, Cities and Wealth].
200 Cited by idem, p. 266 and Alfred Sauvy, Fertility and Survival: Population
Problems from Malthus to Mao Tse-tung (New York, NY: Collier Books, 1963), pp. 211-3.
201 Robert A. Hatcher, et al. Kontraseptif Yöntemler: Uluslararası Basım
[Contraceptive Technology: International Edition] (Ankara: İnsan Kaynağını Geliştirme
Vakfı, 1990), p. 19.
that limits fecundity.202 This practice might take a couple of years
depending on the social acceptance of breast-feed among men and women
in a society. The second factor is continence, which also prolonged breast-
feed.203 Third is the existence of customary and traditional practices that
prevent pregnancy.204 These and other types of birth control practices were
probably known to a great extent by the Ottoman subjects in the nineteenth
century.205 The contraception practices might have affected by a decline in
infant mortality, because when more children survived, parents would
probably desired to control fertility.206 However, the nature of those
practices is unknown.207
The other birth control practices were abortion and infanticide. They
were increased after Tanzimat as a resistance to recruitment policies of the
Ottoman state. One peasant complained in 1861 as: “To what purpose bring
up sons, as soon as they came to an age to be able to help us, [they] are
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liable to be taken away by conscription.”208 Women did not want to bear
children, whose lives were not guaranteed.209 Families generally
countenanced abortion and infanticide for various reasons: to prevent the
problems of pregnancy and to get rid of the children they cannot keep.
However, still there is not enough medical evidence to estimate the density.
Abortion was executed by those so-called ‘bloody midwifes’ (kanlı ebe),
who were very popular among commoners.210 Abortions performed by
these unqualified persons endangered the women’s life. In 1842, a course
for midwifery was opened in İstanbul. The western teachers gave
instructions on modern techniques to the young Ottoman girls. After the end
of these courses, the attendants earned a degree to practice and teach their
knowledge on modern birth techniques and practices in more healthy
conditions.211 However, this effort was limited only to İstanbul and did not
spread to other provinces.
The government documents stressed that even though those birth
control techniques and practices were contrary to canonical law; and
squandering and diminishing state’s taxes, the people could not be
                                                                                                                                                  
207 Quataert, “Age of Reforms”, p. 790. Quataert says that due to the abundance of
Muslim writings and medical handbooks on birth control, it will no be unwise to argue that
many Ottoman subjects were aware of a great variety of birth control techniques.
208 Charles Issawi (ed), The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 23 (quoted in Kasaba, Ottoman Empire, p. 67).
Issawi gives more references of similar complaints emphasized in British Foreign Office
documents.
209 Quataert, “Age of Reforms”, pp. 790-3.
210 Abdülaziz Bey. Osmanlı, Adet, Merasim ve Tabirleri [Âdât ve Merasim-i
Kadime, Tabirât ve Muamelât-ı Kavmiye-i Osmaniye], K. Arısan and D. Arısan Günay
(eds), İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995), p. 25.
persuaded to give them up.212 For the central government, many men and
women absolved themselves from the natural laws of marriage and
procreation. The government ordered the local officials to give wise
information on the types of those practices and to find out to understand
why people were still abstaining from marriage and reproduction, after all
governmental subsidies were utilized in provinces. Furthermore, the
government asked those officials to find new ways of adjusting a system
and minimum expenses to increase marriages.213
Another example for the people’s resistance to population policies
of the state and response to economic conditions was late marriages. For
example, late marriage among female population was common in İstanbul
during the nineteenth century.214 Although there is little information, the
large numbers of unmarried adults in the Ottoman Empire included the
conscripts, sailors, a large portion of those engaged in transportation, and
the male servants in large cities.215 The redif, or reserve, due to spending
part of their time at home, can marry like servants when their masters
permit.216 Clarke argues that the Christian women of the Ottoman Empire
usually married between 18 to 24 ages, but among the Turks the, marriage
ages were varied from 25 to 35 in the harems. Todorov gives the average
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ages at marriage for some Balkan cities ranging between 26 to 31 for men
and 15-21 for women.217 Although later marriage age seems to be
appropriate only for the harems, actually an Ottoman decree talks of the
very common practice of late marriages among women.218 The decree,
issued in 1844,219 stated that in some districts and villages of the Sublime
Porte, maiden girls until the age of thirty were not given permission for
marriage by their fathers and relatives. In addition, widows, for no reason,
stayed single. These cases suggested obstacles on the way to achievement
of government ends of increasing population.220 Late marriage, widowhood,
and celibacy limit a woman’s childbearing years. That is to say, if a woman
stays unmarried for some years her period of childbearing ceased during her
maturity. To prevent these unsuitable obstacles, the government asked for a
fatwa from the Sheikh-ul-Islam. In this fatwa, the Sheikh-ul-Islam argued
that, from the religious point of view, henceforth it was legitimate to punish
anybody, who opposed the marriage of older girls and widows. Any effort
intended to conceal aforementioned cases on the part of the kadıs (judges)
and other local officials, by taking bribes, should also be punished. If
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fathers and relatives insisted on keeping maidens and widows unmarried,
they were to be asked to explain their reasons. If it was realized that there
were no religious constraints, they should be demanded to perform the
marriage. However, it was added that some regions might have been
practicing different customs, prescribed by their traditions, then the others.
As being a valid excuse, if the cost of the marriage in any place was too
high for the families to cover the expenses, then, the marriage could be
delayed for some time. However, the state ordered immediately the
elimination of such unnecessary expenditures.221 This situation was also
common in the Balkan cities. Todorov’s studies on some Balkan cities
displayed that widow’s numbers were considerably high.222 In relation with
late marriages, another one, even though of very small in amount, was the
divorce among young couples, because couples usually have not known
each other before marriage. It seems that a high marriage age for women
and thus only a small number of births per marriage, the Ottoman state
should not be expecting a sustained growth.
Additionally, the central government forbade marriages within
extended families.223 To arrange necessary precautions, the local kadıs were
entrusted authority. Another means for promoting procreation was
subsidizing families. In the sancak of Menteşe, a certain Abdurrahman's
wife had given birth to triplets on November 26 in 1846. About three
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months later, the local council wrote to the Meclis-i Vala that these children
were still in life and demanded an assignment for salary and pension to the
triplets. Meclis-i Vala found this decision appropriate and decided that it
was to be made customary for other places as well and wrote to the Finance
Minister to accomplish the necessary regulations.224 Here we see another
generalization of a particular event. Actually, this decree also displays how
the local decision mechanisms could be affected in the center. Even before
the Tanzimat era, the Ottoman state encouraged procreation. However, this
policy was usually sporadic. For example, in 1818, the government donated
10 akçes per day as an allowance to a mother from Damascus, who gave
birth to triplets.225
After kidnapping of girls in Rumeli became widespread, the central
government ordered that such kind of actions was against the justice of the
state and was both forbidden by canon and civil law. On the part of the
state, these unlawful actions were particularly caused by not paying
attention to security issue and by the lack of police forces. Thus to maintain
the security of the subjects, the government ordered that such offenders
were to be punished according to law and put into prison for six months.
Interestingly, taking those girls out of their home district to another
district’s court for marriage was also prohibited. If such an occasion
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happens, judge of any district should not permit that marriage and punish
the offenders for six months, too.226
Final Remarks on Population Growth
After a possible decline before 1830s, Ottoman population increased
at an average estimated rate of 0.8 per cent per annum.227 According to
Palairet, the population growth of the Balkans was 0.97 per cent per year
between 1790 and 1910. However, growth in Ottoman Europe was below
than that, being 0.8 per cent per annum. A general estimate of population
growth in the Balkans between 1850s and 1870s was stood for 1.1 per cent
per year.228 From 1850s to 1880, the growth rates became slower for both
regions, namely 0.9 per cent per year for the Balkans and 0.7 for the
Ottoman Europe.229
Nevertheless, the most informative statistical data on birth and death
rates for the Ottoman Empire was compiled from the registers done between
1878 and 1914.230 Estimation from these registers displayed that Muslim
birth rate was 49 per thousand and death rate was approximately 29-38 per
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thousand.231 As Quataert concludes, these rates was more or less equal to
that of an ordinary pre-industrial state, such as eighteenth century France.232
However, this information is not sufficient for making a final remark on the
rate of population growth in the Ottoman Empire. There are no accurate
data on the rates of immigration and rates of exact fertility. Rather than the
crude birth and mortality rates (live births or deaths per 1,000 population), it
is well proved that the major determinant of population growth is the
fertility rate, or the refined fertility rate. That is the rate at which female
population procreate children.233 Moreover, it is misleading to make a
connection between decreasing death rate and an increasing birth rate as a
cause of population growth.234 In addition, statistical evidence displayed
that infant mortality rates increased or decreased in proportion to the
number of living children in the family.235
Another impediment is the exact data on the number of in-migrant
population to cities. However, it is possible to make some estimation, which
relied on particular studies had been done on various cities in the Balkans.
For example, Todorov says that movement of rural population to cities
would affect population growth, both positively and negatively. First,
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higher prices and adaptation to new lifestyles in the cities usually affected
the tastes of people and caused a decline in fertility. Second, a possible
increase in per capita income, a continuation of past habits, and availability
of better sanitary conditions could increase fertility rates.236 Todorov argues
that larger cities had a relatively higher population increase, in contrast to
the population of small cities, which generally decreased or remained steady
during the nineteenth century.237 However, the population in the larger
Balkan cities might have been increased through massive in-migration from
rural countryside, rather than a natural growth.
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CONCLUSION
This analysis of the population policies in the nineteenth century
Ottoman state inspired by the archival documents of the period, and
supported by contemporary second hand sources. However, due to the
insufficiency of empirical works on this subject, this study remains
incomplete. Such empirical data would have been useful for making
comparisons with European developments and would have helped to picture
the Ottoman case more accurately. This study will be better articulated,
once the appropriate data and numbers are effectively derived from the
archival documents. As such, more work had to be done on how statistical
information on population and policies pertaining to it differentiated,
codified, and institutionalized in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Nevertheless, I have attempted to construct a model based on the
protection and the procreation of the Ottoman population. The importance
of protection and procreation of a labor force for agricultural production,
trade, and industry was substantiated by the policies of the Ottoman
government in the early period of the Tanzimat to prevent peasantry from
emigration and banditry, and to encourage marriage and reproduction. Such
an approach is a very important step towards building a more accurate and
all-encompassing understanding of the reform policies of the Tanzimat era.
I have tried to distance myself from previous works, which only deal with
the collection of numbers from the censuses of the nineteenth century. A
close analysis of these censuses could not give us enough information
without discussing the post-Tanzimat practices of the Ottoman state, which
were generally tried to be undertaken by administrative reforms.
The objective of local construction projects and the new taxation
system was to secure the subsistence requirements of peasants. The
government controlled the movement of population, because of the need for
labor force for agriculture and reconstruction works in the provinces.
Modern police forces were established in the countryside to maintain order,
to collect local taxes and to eliminate the threats of banditry. The
government implemented sanitary policies to improve the living conditions
of people and to protect the health of the population. The state’s policies
against poor and needy were mostly directed to keep a part of the
population as reserves for potential laborers and recruits, thus preventing
them to be a threat for the public order. On the other hand, the bandit
attacks were also a threat to the entire population and the state. On the part
of the state, they caused a danger for its security. Thus, those attacks had to
be dealt with collectively, such as by the state and the affected population,
by the police and gendermarie forces, or by the army, when the threat went
beyond the power limits of any part of the population. But, there also exists
a contradiction here. It is the withdrawing or keeping a productive part of
the population in barracks and others in reserve that would be destructive to
agricultural production. One of the preventive measures was the control of
the movement of population. The Ottoman state usually implemented police
restrictions on people’s immigration from one place to another. To put in
another way, the Ottoman state tried to spread its security matters to the
whole population in the nineteenth century. Some of the new regulatory
texts and codes of the post-Tanzimat period, such as the decisions of the
councils, certain decrees and the Criminal Code, shared a common feature
for maintaining the social order and disciplining the unruly parts of the
population. That is, all the offenders of social order were to be punished.
Protection of the existing population was not enough for the
Ottoman state for materializing its aims and policies. When the population
came to be considered as a source of wealth, then it was to be multiplied. In
relation with the nineteenth century conceptions of population, procreation
was extremely crucial for increasing and sustaining the production,
especially the agricultural production. However, the state’s policies of
population growth did not usually compatible with personal, or group
decisions. People did not want to increase the family size. If they felt they
could make themselves better by having many children, then why they
resisted to population growth is an important issue for further research. This
implies that the Ottoman population, whether instinct or rational, controlled
fertility.
Except for some very few studies, there are no individual works that
is devoted entirely to population issue, which significantly affected the
development of the Ottoman modern state in the nineteenth century.
Population processes and trends, at best, generally take a tiny part of the
Ottoman studies. On the other hand, there are plenty of studies that had
been done for western countries, especially after the 1960s. For instance,
more studies had to be done on demographic response of rural population to
proto-industrialization in the Ottoman state. One could be the effect of
female labor on population growth, which was dominated most of the rural
industry after the destruction of the Janissary institution in 1826. In
particular, after the destruction of the Janissary army in 1826, male
dominated labor in the guilds also declined. Thus, share of male labor in
manufacture decreased sharply. But, this vacuum was filled by female labor
working in their households as a part of the putting-out system. Male and
female demands for marriage were to be shifted in response to changing
economic conditions. Mokyr’s study on Ireland has revealed that the
development of rural industry made women marry in later ages then men.238
However, the lack of statistical data remains as an important obstacle for the
researcher.
The declining fertility rates and fleeing of rural population to cities
or to other nearby countries were responses to increasing population
pressure or to worsening economic conditions. However, this account is
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somewhat problematic in two ways. First, the rural population can shift to
manufacturing within the countryside,239 or migrate to cities in search of
better livelihood, which was relatively very common in the Balkans during
the nineteenth century.240 Second, the causes of population pressure and
economic conditions and rural responses to them cannot be substantially
differentiated from each other.241
The available population data for the first half of the nineteenth
century is not fully enough to draw a wider picture of the population
policies of the Ottoman state. But, if we are to understand how the concern
of the government on population issue affected the development of the
Ottoman modern state in the nineteenth century, we must better not to count
only the number of ‘heads’, fertility rates, age-sex compositions, and
population densities in the censuses; but social, economic, institutional, and
educational aspects of those numbers and rates. More significantly, we need
more information on the population policies of the Ottoman Empire to
conduct comparative analysis with other states, which will challenge some
of the already established assumptions on the nature of Ottoman state in the
nineteenth century.
The population policies interrelated with the whole body of social,
economic, military, educational, and sanitary reforms after the Tanzimat.
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These policies failed because of the social and political turbulence and the
financial collapse of the Empire writ large, in which the Ottoman state
could not deliver and accommodate existing tensions within the society.
Therefore, if we are to understand the population issue that affected the
formation of the Ottoman modern state in the nineteenth century, we must
better to study social, cultural, institutional, economic, educational, political
and administrative aspects of it within both state and society.
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